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The purpose of this study is to define the American national
interest in such a way that it can be used by decision-makers
when formulating technology transfer policy, and to determine
the significance of East-West technology transfer to American
security.
The initial hypotheses of the study were: 1) how one views
the Soviet Union directly affects one's perceptions towards the
imperitiveness of the linkage between technology and U.S.
security; 2) technology is a vital element in U.S. national
security; 3) the Soviet Union greatly benefits from the Western
technology it receives either overtly or through illegal
channels; 4) Western technology positively impacts Soviet
economic growth; and, 5) the Soviet Union benefits twice from
acquired Western technology, first from the initial
incorporation, and second, from the advantages associated with
transferring those goods to a Third World client.
The research substantiates all but hypothesis four.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis is concerned with technology transfer and
the American national interest. How can America's
technology transfer policy be made consistent with the
national interest?
The American national interest today is a process of
historic evolution. It is partly composed of unchanging
core values deep-rooted in the words of our founding
fathers. The unchanging side of the national interest had
survived a devastating civil war, two world wars, one police
action and a major conflict in southeast Asia. On the other
hand, these same historic events greatly contributed to the
evolutionary change of the national interest. The meaning
of Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness as expressed
in our Declaration of Independence has changed over the
years, but the true essence of those words is as much a part
of the great American heritage today as it was two hundred
years ago. The core values as expressed in the Declaration
of Independence, Constitution, Bill of Rights and the 10th
Federalist Papers have bent, but they have not broken. Even
America a short time ago, torn by Vietnam, has regrouped
under the Reagan Administration, and is again willing and
able to defend the national interest.
The question often arises, just what is the American
national interest? Can it be operationalized, and if so
what are the implications for East West technology transfer?
These are important questions that should be addressed. So
many Americans have made the ultimate sacrifice to defend
the national interest. Truly it must be a great thing, for
men who cherish life as much as Americans do, to defend it
to the death. This is why it is imperative that American
policy-makers have in their minds a definition of the
national interest when they are making decisions, including
decisions concerning technology transfer.
Chapter II of this study will address the question, what
is the national interest and what policies are appropriate
in pursuing the national interest?
The question of technology transfer is put into perspec-
tive in Chapters III, IV and V. The hypothesis; how one
views the Soviet Union directly affects one's perceptions
towards the imperativeness of the linkage between technology
and U.S. security, is explored in Chapter III. Chapter IV
examines the second hypothesis; technology is a vital
element in U.S. national security.
Intuition would dictate that the Soviet Union takes
great pains in acquiring Western technology. The exigent
question is, how much do they benefit from the technology
they receive, and even more pressing, how does Western
technology impact the Soviet Defense Industry? This
intuitive reasoning leads to the third hypothesis; the
Soviet Union greatly benefits from the Western technology it
receives either overtly or through illegal means. The third
hypothesis will be addressed in Chapter V along with the
fourth hypothesis; Western technology positively impacts
Soviet economic growth.
The fifth hypothesis interrelates with the third in that
it assumes that the Soviet Union greatly benefits from
acquired Western technology. Chapter VII will focus on the
hypothesis; the Soviet Union benefits twice from acquired
Western technology, first from the initial incorporation,
and second, from the advantages associated with transferring
those goods to a Third World client. It is logical to
assume that after Western technology is assimilated into the
Soviet defense industry, it makes its way into the Third
World through arms exports. If this is a valid theory, and
one assumes that the Soviet Union benefits from arms export
to the Third World, then the next logical questions are:
how much does Western technology impact Soviet arms exports
to the Third World, is this impact positive, and if yes, is
it consequential to the United States? Chapter VI will
cynosure Third World arms trade and arms industry as a
background to Chapter VII.
Chapter VIII will explore the notion of technology as a
strategy, along with possible benefits Eastern technology
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might have for the West, and whether or not it could be used
in a grand technological strategy.
This study is written under the assumption that there is
a conflict between defense and social spending issues and
foreign and domestic policy, and that both policies are
vital to America's interests, but even more important is the
defense of the nation against the evergrowing Soviet threat.
The greater controversy lies in the guestion, how much
defense is enough?
There is, at times, a conflict between the national
interest and foreign policy decisions made under the guise
of the national interest for security reasons. Also the
fact that some politicians pawn off decisions in the name of
the national interest when in actuality they are in the best
interest of their party or their constituency. This will be
taken into account when addressing the issues.
The purpose of this study is to define the American
national interest in a way that it can be used by decision-
makers when formulating technology transfer policy, and to
focus attention on the importance of technology to American
security and how that same technology governed by no
strategy or a poor strategy can adversely impact American
security.
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II. THE NATIONAL INTEREST
Defining the American national interest is not a simple
task. Anyone who has researched the subject was more than
likely surprised given the importance of the subject at the
lack of scholarly work available.
If one assumes the hypothesis that U.S. foreign policy
is based on the national interest, the significance of
having a theoretical if not working (operational) definition
of the national interest is paramount for all policy
makers. 1 It is from this perspective that the subject is
pursued.
The difficulty in defining the national interest lies in
the fact that the national interest is an intuitive concept
rooted in subjective, non quantifiable values. 2 It is for
this very reason that analysts find it most difficult to
operationalize the concept. As a concept, national interest
is used in both political analysis and political action.
The national interest as an analytic tool is employed to
describe, explain, or evaluate the sources, or the adequacy
of a nation's foreign policy. As an instrument of
^-Joseph C. Menendez, Influence: U.S. National
Interests and the Republic of the Philippines
, p. 13,
Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School: Monterey,
California, December 1981.
2James N. Rosenau, "National Interest," p. 34, as
presented in the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences .
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"political action" it serves as a means of justifying,
denouncing, or proposing policies. Either as an analytic
tool or as an instrument of political action the emphasis is
on what is good for the nation. In regard to policy-makers
this usually means what is the best national interest as far
as foreign policy decisions are concerned. 3 This is a Catch
22. It assumes that American policy-makers have a working
definition of the national interest. It also assumes that
all foreign policy decisions uphold the values that America
stands for. Or do they?
Take for example the case of the U.S. supporting its
long and faithful ally, Marcos. It was in the best national
interest to maintain friendly relations with the president
of the nation that houses the United States' two largest
military bases outside the states proper, even if some of
Marcos' actions were not in keeping with the finest tradi-
tions of freedom and democracy. A more recent example of a
clash between U.S. ideology and foreign policy can be seen
by the Reagan Administration's refusal to take a hardline
stance against the South African government. The adminis-
tration feels that it is best serving the national interests
by not shutting the door on the Botha regime even when faced
with strong opposition by both liberal and conservative
elements within the United States.
3J.N. Rosenau, "National Interest," p. 34
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The ultimate challenge for policy-makers at the present
and in the future lie in creating policy that in the past
have adhered to and served the national interest as it is
traditionally defined, and bringing it into harmonic balance
with the human interest of eliminating war and poverty,
promoting human rights and halting ecological decay. 4
Viewing this problematically, they can be stated in regard
to order values. For Robert Johansen these include: uni-
lateral disarmament (eliminating a need for armies)
,
economic well-being for all, universal human rights and
social justice, and ecological balance. When one views this
on a world scale, the complexity and controversial nature of
the problem confronting the policy-maker illuminates. The
difficulty of the problem in no way excuses the policy-maker
from doing what is right for the nation as a whole.
Hans Morgenthau, on the other hand, emphasized that the
"objectives of a foreign policy must be defined in terms of
the national interest." According to him, "the kind of
interest determining political action in a particular period
of history depends upon the political and cultural context
within which policy is formulated." 5 The national interest
for Morgenthau is one guiding star to follow, one standard
4Robert C. Johansen, The National Interest and the
Human Interest , p. 20, Princeton University Press, 1980.
5J.N. Rosenau, "National Interest," p. 35.
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of thought, and one rule of action. 6 This indicates at
least that the national interest is changing over time, but
is there a hierarchy to it?
In a study by Maynes, Yankelovich, and Cohen, there are
eight reoccurring themes in defining the national interest. 7
They were:
1. a strong defense posture




4 good relations with the PRC
5. commitment to Israel
6. American leadership in world affairs
7. involvement in international foreign policy solutions
8. coherent energy policies.
Joseph Menendez ' thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School
questions whether these are in fact independent interests or
instrumental goals, that is, a goal that leads to the
attainment of a higher or more important goal. For example,
is not commitment to core allies an instrumental goal of a
strong defense posture? 8 The above mentioned study by
Maynes, Yankelovich, and Cohen was written in 197 6. A more
current study might yield different results. Perhaps the
6J.N. Rosenau, "National Interest," p. 35.
7J.C. Menendez, Influence; U.S. National Interest and
the Republic of the Philippines , p. 19.
8J.C. Menendez, Influence: U.S. National Interest and
the Republic of the Philippines , p. 19.
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pursuit of detente and possibly a coherent energy policy
would be left off a list compiled today. They may be
replaced by the need to balance the budget.
A. A HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT NATIONAL INTEREST
As stated earlier, the national interest is an instru-
ment of action and a tool of analysis. Historians, in
tracing the concept back to its beginnings find a much
longer history of the national interest as an instrument of
action. Political entities formulated policy based on the
national interest dating as early as the sixteenth century
in Italy and the seventeenth century in England. Claims
were made in the name of the "will of the prince," "dynastic
interests" and other such phrases. As nationalism began to
rise, and the concept of the divine rights of kings
diminished, new phraseology such as the "national honor,"
the "public interest," and the "general will" began to
emerge as replacements. 9
In America, since the conception of the Constitution,
statesmen utilized the term national interest. It was not
until the nineteen hundreds, and because of World War I and
World War II, that policy-makers fully realized the impact
the mass public had in formulating foreign policy. Since
that point the term "national interest" became a tool in
which analysts could describe, explain, and assess the
9J.N. Rosenau, "National Interest," p. 35
16
foreign policies of the nation. This same time period also
saw the concept national interest being distinguished from
the term "public interest," which has come to be used in
regard to the domestic policies of America. 10
B. THE NATIONAL INTEREST AS AN ANALYTIC TOOL
1. The Obiectivists
Since the advent of the national interest as an
analytic tool there have been many theories of what the
national interest is and how to operationalize the concept.
The objectivists formulated one such theory based upon
observations made during World War II and the events leading
up to it. The objectivists believe that the best interest
of the nation is a matter of objective reality. To know and
describe reality will enable policy-makers to use the
concept of the national interest "as a basis for evaluating
the appropriateness of the policies which a nation
pursues." 11 The limitations of this theory lie in that
their inquiries do not rest upon a methodological and philo-
sophical foundation, and that they believe correspondence
between their descriptions and the objective situation is
self-evident. For this reason they do not find it necessary
to explain how or why their descriptions of the national
10J.N. Rosenau, "National Interest," p. 35
1:LJ.N. Rosenau, "National Interest," p. 35
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interest are in accord with reality. 12 In short, the
objectivists believe that each state has an objective
national interest.
2 . The Subiectivists
A less scientific and more difficult approach to
operationalizing the national interest is the method of the
subjectivists. The objectivists were concerned with the
worth of foreign policies. On the contrary, the subjectiv-
ists focus on explaining why nations act in the manner they
do in the international arena. Intriguing to them was the
role the national interest played in explaining the actions
of a nation state. They concluded that a nation naturally
acts with its best interest in mind in order to satisfy
certain needs and wants. If they can identify these needs
and wants, they, as analysts, would be able to use the
concept of the national interest as a tool of analysis. For
the subjectivists, "national interest is not a singular
objective truth that prevails whether or not it is perceived
by the members of a nation, but it is, rather, a pluralistic
set of subjective preferences that change whenever the
requirements and aspirations of the nation's members
change." 13 Furniss and Snyder put it this way, "The
national interest is what the nation, i.e., the decision
12J.N. Rosenau, "National Interest," p. 35
13J.N. Rosenau, "National Interest," p. 35.
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maker decides it is." 14 The definite shortcoming to this
approach is the difficulty in identifying the needs and
wants of a nation, along with the fact that interpretation
of a society's values are left up to the decision-maker.
There of course will also be special interest groups voicing
opinions that influence policy-makers.
Donald Nuechterlein fits in this group. His theory
is based on the premise that political scientists should
attempt to more accurately define the goals, objectives, and
drives of nation-states in the international system. 15 The
concept national interest should be resurrected to the
stature it rightfully deserves. Nuechterlein ' s objective is
to define the national interest in such a way that it can be
used as a viable analytic tool in which statesmen can better
assess how other states view their national interests, and
in particular their vital interests for the purpose of more
accurately projecting the kinds of policies and actions
likely to be employed when those interests are challenged. 16
His first step is to derive universal definitions regarding
the goals of states. This is a prereguisite to explaining
state behavior. An obstacle along the way for Nuechterlein
14J.N. Rosenau, "National Interest," p. 35.
15Donald E. Nuechterlein, National Interest and
Presidential Leadership: The Setting of Priorities , p.
xiii, Westview Press, Colorado, 1978.
16D.E. Nuechterlein, National Interest and Presidential
Leadership: The Setting of Priorities , p. xvi.
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is the theoretical opposition presented by the objectivists
or as Nuechterlein prefers to refer to them as the "realist"
school of thought led by Hans Morgenthau, George Kennen,
"and the disciples of the realist cult." 17 Their theory
does not account for "public opinion" and its impact on
foreign policy. The president and a handful of advisors
make all the decisions. In comparison, Nuechterlein defines
the national interest as the "perceived needs and desires of
one sovereign state in relation to the sovereign states
comprising its external environment." 18 He clearly makes a
distinction between external and internal environment. The
internal environment of the nation refers to the public
interest whereas the external environment of the nation
refers to the national interest, much in the same way James
Rosenau views the split. Further, the national interest for
Nuechterlein is the interest of the whole, i.e., not of any
one interest group or bureaucratic entity, or political
group within the state. Although, he does not downplay the
importance of the interest group or the bureaucratic
mechanism of the state in regard to the role they play in
formulating the national interest.
17 D.E. Nuechterlein, National Interest and Presidential
Leadership; The Setting of Priorities
, p. 2.
18 D.E. Nuechterlein, National Interest and Presidential





In order to operationalize his theory, Nuechterlein
derived a set of definitions for the basic interests of a
nation, or its national needs. 19 They are as follows:
1. Defense interests: the protection of the nation state
(defense of homeland) and its citizens against the
threat of physical violence directed from another
state or against an externally inspired threat to its
system of government.
2. Economic interests: the enhancement of the nation-
state's economic well-being in relations with other
states.
3. World order interests: the maintenance of an inter-
national political and economic system in which its
citizens and commerce may operate peacefully outside
its borders.
4. Ideological interests: the protection and furtherance
set of values that the citizens of a nation-state
share and believe to be universally good.
4 Intensities of Interest
In order to further enhance his ability to opera-
tionalize the national interest, Nuechterlein derived vary-
ing degrees or intensities of interest. 20 They are:
1. Survival issues: when the very existence of nation-
state is in jeopardy, as a result of overt military
attack on its own territory, or the threat of attack
if an enemy's demands are rejected.
2. Vital issues: when serious harm will very likely
result to the state unless strong measures, including
the use of conventional military forces, are employed
to counter an adverse action by another state or to
deter it from undertaking a serious provocation.
19 D.E. Nuechterlein, National Interest and Presidential
Leadership: The Setting of Priorities , p. 4.
20D.E. Nuechterlein, National Interest and Presidential
Leadership: The Setting of Priorities , p. 8.
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3. Major issues: when a state's political, economic, and
ideological well-being may be adversely affected by
events and trends in the international environment and
thus reguires corrective action in order to prevent
them from becoming serious threats (vital interests)
.
4. Peripheral issues: when a state's well-being is not
adversely affected by events or trends abroad, but
when the interests of private citizens and companies
operating in other countries might be endangered.
How does Nuechterlein use his basic interests and
his intensity of interests to operationalize the national
interest?
Nuechterlein created a matrix that allows the
analyst to assess what policies decision-makers should
pursue. This matrix identifies the national interest of a
nation-state by comparing the intensity of interest, whether
it be survival, vital, major, or peripheral, with the basic
interest at stake like defense economic favorable or ideo-
logical. This example will better explain how the matrix
works. 21
Country: US Issue: Vietnam, 1965
Basic interest at stake Intensity of interest
Survival Vital Major Peripheral
Defense of homeland X
Economic well-being X
Favorable world order X
Ideological X
21D.E. Nuechterlein, National Interest and Presidential
Leadership: The Setting of Priorities , p. 88.
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According to Nuechterlein, "An important conclusion
should be drawn from this. Namely, the United States ought
to have more than one of its basic national interests rooted
at the vital level before its leaders contemplate using
military force outside North America again." 22
Nuechterlein may be the closest subjectivist to
derive an operational definition of the national interest,
but he still comes up short. Like other subjectivist
theorists, Nuechterlein tried to make a complex subject
simple but failed. His theory has its foundations
entrenched in assumptions. It does not take into account
the various values that make up the national interest, or
their changing nature. He failed to fully recognize the
significance of the special interest groups, and their
importance to the national interest.
As a tool of analysis the national interest has not
been all that successful. This can be attested to by the
immense deficiencies of the mentioned theories. The utility
value of the national interest as an analytic tool is even
lessened further by the increase of world interdependence.
The new kids on the block are the West, the East, the Arab
world and so on. Policy-makers are making decisions in
terms of enhancing these supranational entities. This is
not to say that the national interest is dying. Nationalism
22 D.E. Nuechterlein, National Interest and Presidential
Leadership: The Setting of Priorities , p. 95.
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is still very strong and will be around for a long time.
The national interest's future lies in its use in politics.
It is as an analytic tool that it is dying. 23
C. THE VALUE-LADEN CHARACTER OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST
If one concludes that the national interest is rooted in
values, it is imperative to have a working knowledge of what
those values are. The thought process of the policy-maker
is inadequate without it. There are several indicators of
the priorities that make up the national interest. Some of
these are the national budget, politics and literature, and
presidential leadership. This paper will briefly examine
each.
1. The Budget
"The budget is the single greatest indicator of the
threat facing the national interest." 24 During the
budgetary process the nation allocates its fiscal and
national resources for the purpose of obtaining the goals
set by the national security policy.
The budgetary process used today by the Planning,
Programming, and Budget System (PPBS) is based upon a
strategy developed to counter an anticipated threat. Force
requirements are then established based on the strategy.
23J.N. Rosenau, "National Interest," p. 39.
24Quote taken from a lecture of Dr. Frank Teti,
Professor of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate
School, 1985.
24
From those force requirements come manning requirements and
weapon systems. Finally, budgetary allocations support the
derived requirements of manning and weapon systems research
and development (R&D) . PPBS usually interfaces between
military strategy and specific defense programs.
The nature of a threat is determined by threat
analysis. Threat analysis infers the ability to accurately
determine that one nation or group of nations are potential-
ly dangerous to another. This statement insinuates that the
political, economic, and military goals of the threat nation
are in conflict with, for our purpose, the United States.
Also, that the threat nation (s) possess equal or greater
power and have the ability and potential will to use it.
The nature of the threat has visibly changed over the past
twenty years. During the period of detente the United
States' national priorities changed significantly. The per-
centage increase for civilian programs such as human re-
source programs—health, income maintenance, education,
manpower, housing, and community development, has increased
greatly as compared to that for national defense. 25 The
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan renewed the awareness of the
dangerous nature of the threat. This is evident in how the
"pie" has been cut since President Carter's last budget.
25Robert P. Mayo, "Budgetary Considerations," p. 5, as
presented in National Priorities , M.B. Schnapper, editor;
(Public Affairs Press, 1969)
.
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The point is that it is American values that interpret the
threat.
2 . Presidential Leadership
The Office of the President of the United States is
the most powerful political position in the world. It is
for this reason that presidential leadership is so important
to the decision-making process, i.e., the process based upon
the interpretation of values that formulate the national
interest. A charismatic and effective leader can influence
the decision-making process like no other individual or
group. During times of crisis this influence is amplified
and the American people tend to rally around the president
in added numbers.
By following the Office of the President, one can
view the pulse of the nation's values at any given time.
The president is the leader of the nation, and like all
leaders of any organization, sets the tone for the organiza-
tion. He is the most important policy-maker, but, despite
the vast power the president possesses, he is still accoun-
table to the will of the people and to the system he
presides over. This system is commonly referred to as the
MADISONIAN MODEL. 26
The best way to describe the concept of the Madison-
ian model is to say it is a model that displays the moderate
tradition of American politics, and the American policy
26See the 10th Federalist Papers.
26
making process. The essence of the Madisonian model is the
combination of numerous elements and inputs. It is the
model of the compromise consensus cycle of American poli-
tics. Its most general element is majority rule, but it
allows for various special interest groups to have an input
in the political process.
The Madisonian model receives its strength from the
fact that each player has an input into the political proc-
ess, and every player has the potential to win. The model
allows for change but always maintains a moderate position.
This produces a sense of political stability because all
major decisions tend to gravitate towards the center.
The Madisonian model explains some of the con-
straints placed upon the office of the presidency but it
does not diminish the utility of studying the policies of
the office in order to gain an understanding of just what
American values are. If anything the Madisonian model
enhances the usefulness of presidentology for that purpose.
Two very good examples of what American values are can be
seen in the national interest as expressed in the Reagan
doctrine and the State of the Union Address.
3 . The Reagan Doctrine
The Reagan Doctrine is very explicit in regard to
its meaning. President Reagan, in the State of the Union,
February 1985 stated, "We must not break faith with those
who are risking their lives on every continent from
27
Afghanistan to Nicaragua to defy Soviet-supported aggression
and secure rights which have been ours from birth ....
Support for freedom fighters is self-defense." President
Reagan reiterated those words in 1986, "To those imprisoned
in regimes held captive, to those beaten for daring to fight
for freedom and democracy— for their right to warship, to
speak, to live and prosper in the family of free nations—we
say to you tonight: You are not alone freedom fighters.
America will support with moral and material assistance your
right not just to fight and die for freedom, but to fight
and win freedom—to win freedom in Afghanistan, Angola,
Cambodia and Nicaragua." These words are an indicator that
support of freedom fighters and the promotion of democracy
are part of the American national interest. The Reagan
Doctrine pulls its strength from the American revolutionary
heritage that is supported in the U.S. Constitution, along
with the fact that the United States is the world democratic
leader. Fascinating is the fact that the Reagan Doctrine
supports not the status quo but revolution. 27
The State of the Union Address is an outstanding
indication for determining the priorities within the
national interest. In the 1986 State of the Union Address,
President Reagan made it clear just what was the nation's
number one priority. He stated that, "Defense is not just
27Charles Krauthammer, "The Reagan Doctrine," Time
Magazine , p. 54, 1 April, 1985.
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another budget expense. Keeping America strong, free, and
at peace is solely the responsibility of the federal
government; it is government's prime responsibility." He
left no room for questions as to just what the threat was
either. "We have denoted five years trying to narrow a
dangerous gap born of illusion and neglect. And we've made
important gains. Yet the threat from Soviet forces, conven-
tional and strategic, from the Soviet drive for domination,
from the increase in espionage and state terror remains
great. This is reality. Closing our eyes will not make
reality disappear."
4 . Politics and Literature
Henry F. May in his book, The End of American
Innocence , places great emphasis on politics and literature.
They are, "the most important and revealing means of Ameri-
can self-expression." 28 Politics, literature, art, and
cinema are all direct indicators of the values of the time.
May uses examples from literature and politics to explain a
phenomenon that took place in America. He believes that no
one will deny that sometime in the twentieth century,
America went through a cultural revolution. The cultural
revolution May is talking about took place in 1917. It was,
as May put it, "the End of American Innocence." It was the
end of the American credo of moralism, progress, and a
28Henry F. May, The End of American Innocence , p. xiii
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1959.
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belief in culture. The first world war was not the cause of
the revolution. The seed was already planted by a success-
ful internal assault on American Innocence that started in
1912, and by external forces that influenced the revolution.
These external forces include the scientific, philosophical,
and social influences that primarily came from Europe begin-
ning in the nineteenth century, such as the writings of
Freud and Hume, Darwin's Theory of Evolution, and Einstein's
Theory of Relativity. 29
May's theory of the utility value of expression is
evident by the literature, movies, and art of the Vietnam
era. This was a very turbulent time in American history.
There were direct and almost treasonous acts by anti-war
protestors. The anti-establishment, anti-war theme was very
prevalent during this period. The after-shock of the war
was felt for years in themes about anti-heroes leading
fights against the establishment.
One such anti-hero was Billy Jack, a Vietnam vet who was
ex-special forces and an expert in karate. All Billy Jack
wanted to do was live his life in seclusion, free from out-
side interference. But he could not turn his back on those
people being oppressed by both the establishment (the
politicians, police, and military) , and the anti-establish-
ment (degenerates such as the Hell's Angels). The Billy
Jack theme typified a quest for a happier time when there
29H.F. May, The End of American Innocence , pp. 219-248
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was a distinction between good and evil, and right and
wrong. Billy Jack was the John Wayne of the Vietnam
generation.
The follies of war theme was common during this
period. This did not necessarily mean that literature or
the cinema had a direct Vietnam war theme. For example, the
movie M*A*S*H was set during the Korean war period. It did,
although, have an overwhelming Vietnam flavor. How often
does one think of Korean war era soldiers sitting around
indulging in drugs?
D. AN OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST
The search for an operational definition of the national
interest can be compared with the quest for Utopia. If a
survey was taken of individual perceptions of Utopia, it is
dubious that there will be any two definitions that are
exactly alike. Although, there would more than likely be a
common theme or set of themes present in all of the defini-
tions. This common denominator can be a useful tool in
helping one operationalize the national interest. However,
some theorists do warn against defining the national inter-
est in terms of an underlying common denominator, because it
narrows the definition of the concept. 30 This may be true
but, as long as one's knowledge of the concept is not
30Friedrich Kratochwil, "On the Notion of Interest in
International Relations," International Organization 3 6
(winter 1982) : 1-30.
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narrowed there is no harm done. There is a difference
between a narrowed definition that enhances its utility and
a narrow knowledge of the concept that serves no useful
purpose at all. The theoretical knowledge of the national
interest must come first before the operational knowledge of
the concept.
A grand attempt at providing an operational definition
of the American national interest can be seen in an article
entitled, "The Quest for an Operational Definition of the
National Interest." 31 The author's thesis is that the
utility value of the concept national interest has been
minimized due to a lack of articulation in providing the
needed direction, coordination, commitment, and legitimacy.
Once these elements can be articulated, the national
interest can then assume its role as the standard by which
public actions can be evaluated. 32
The author identifies three component elements of the
national interest. They are:
1. The historical-cultural foundation: is a body of
experience and political-legal structure which fluents
a particular notion of reality. The author, through
what he calls a "sociology of knowledge model,"
attempts to show a hierarchical linkage between indi-
vidual thought, social thought, and action. At the
heart of this knowledge attitudes and aspirations
which in turn influence the frames of reference of
political perceptions. These perceptions ultimately
31Frank M. Teti, "The Quest for an Operational Defini-
tion of the National Interest," an unpublished article.
32 F.M. Teti, "The Quest for an Operational Definition
of the National Interest."
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determine political actions. Three systems of thought
arise from the answering of the core metaphysical
question of the nature of man; the materialistic, the
idealistic, and the pluralistic systems of thought.
2. The problematic or situational context: refers to the
specific problems which pressure society to think
and/or act. These refer to the real-world demands of
society that both initiate the decision-making process
and provide the framework in which the context takes
place.
3. The hierarchy of perceived or actual needs: the
interaction of the first two elements produce these
needs. How this interaction takes place depends on
the specific political system involved. In a system
with a pluralistic orientation such as America, the
synthesis of diverse and variant opinions takes place
within the context of the Madisonian model. "Diverse
elements within the polity may pursue their interests
no further than the bounds of possible compromise." 33
The author admits to certain shortcomings in his
theory. A pluralistic society by its nature inter-
prets historical experiences, cultural norms, priori-
ties of action, and perceived needs differently. But,
he perceives the problem not lying with the diversity
of perceptions but rather that "at the present time
there is no formal machinery for synthesizing diverse
political knowledge into a national consensus." 34 If
this can be accomplished it would free America from
national policies that are developed basically on no
more than demand of the moment. 35
The above quest for an operational definition of the
national interest includes such key elements as national
needs and problematic correspondence, i.e., specific
problems which pressure society to think and/or act. Others
that are worthy of mention are legitimacy, realism versus
33 F.M. Teti, "The Quest for an Operational Definition
of the National Interest."
34 F.M. Teti, "The Quest for an Operational Definition
of the National Interest."
35F.M. Teti, "The Quest for an Operational Definition
of the National Interest."
33
idealism, and goals, values, ideologies, and the national
identity. Each is important in its own right.
1. Legitimacy
Legitimacy is a concept paramount to any political
decision. The same is true when speaking of the legitimacy
of the national interest. The legitimacy of the national
interest implies that it is in keeping with the principles
and standards of the United States, remains within the
boundaries of the Constitution, and has the support of the
American people. Legitimacy is the key element of the




A survey of the literature covering the spectrum of
American history reveals a transformation between Idealism
and Realism. May called it the End of American Innocence.
It was not all that terrible, as May points out, "The End of
American Innocence was part of a great tragedy, but it was
not, in itself, an unmitigated disaster. Those who look at
it with dismay, or those who deny that it happened, do so
because they expect true stories to have a completely happy
ending. This is a kind of innocence American history must
get over." 36
Walter Lippman also wrote about, the transition
between idealism to realism. He wrote about the first world
war ending the greatest domestic reform movement in American
36H.F. May, The End of American Innocence , p. 398.
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history. The nineteen twenties was a period of retreat. It
was a period in which an innocent culture transformed into a
realist culture. People just wanted to be left alone. They
had been tricked by the government who got them into the war
that was supposed to end all wars and make the world safe
for democracy. The immediate result was the roaring
twenties, the most corrupt period in America. The attitude
that the government can not be trusted, an attitude that
developed during that period has become a part of American
psyche. There have been periods when this attitude lay
dormant, such as the second world war, the 1950' s period of
conformity, and the 1980 's to date, the period of the resur-
rection of patriotism. No longer are decision-makers going
to be allowed the luxury of acting as though this psyche
does not exist.
The split between idealism, and realism must be
accounted for when formulating an operational definition of
the national interest and when addressing the question of
technology transfer.
3 . Goals, Values, Ideologies, and the National Identity
President Reagan, in his last two state of the union
addresses unequivocally stated that the primary goal of the
federal government is defense. Also included as goals are
support of freedom fighters and the promotion of world
democracy. Democracy is part of the national identity as
well as the American ideology. Support of these and other
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values such as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness
are in the American national interest. But these are not
the only goals the president spoke of.
President Reagan spoke of the public interest as
those goals and values that affect the internal policy of
the nation. The national interest and the public interest
are intertwined. The values that apply to the national
interest apply to the public interest. Although the values
are the same, the national interest and the public interest
often come in conflict with each other. This happens most
notably in the fight for the national budget.
4 . The Public Interest
The concept "public interest" is as illusive as the
national interest, but just as important to understand. The
public interest affects the domestic policies of the nation.
Ernest S. Griffith defines it as: "The concept of public
interest may be broadly viewed, even to the extent of treat-
ing it as roughly synonymous with general welfare. Such a
definition holds it capable of permeating all action, both
individual and institutional." 37 Griffith believes there
are certain public interest goals as expressed by the
Christian ethical definition of the concept. 38 They are:
37Ernest S. Griffith, "The Ethical Foundations of the
Public Interest," p. 14, as presented in The Public Inter-
est , Carl J. Friedrich, editor; (Princton-Hall Inc., 1962).
38E.S. Griffith, "The Ethical Foundations of the Public
Interest," p. 21.
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1. Freedom of religion.
2. Education for all to the limit of one's ability.
3
.
Freedom of speech and media of communication (within
moral limits)
.
4. A standard of living that includes nourishment and
pleasant homes.
5. Constructive work available for all who desire it.
Griffith makes a distinction between the goal expressed by
the Christian ethical definition of the concept and the
guidelines for "decision-makers including voters who seek to
discover and act in the public interest." 39 They are:
1. Other things being equal, decisions should favor the
consumer rather than the producer.
2. Other things being equal, decisions should favor the
future generations rather than the present, long-term
rather than short-term goals.
3. Other things being equal, freedom rather than coercion
should be favored.
4. Decisions should assume a basic equality among indi-
viduals as "end" or as "children of God" in matters of
rights and justice.
When considering the overall goals of America, there
seems to be reoccurring themes that combine both national
interest and public interest goals. This once again
supports the theory that they are interrelated. Walter P.
Reuther developed a liberal view on just what the goal for
America should be, by defining it in terms of complete
equality of opportunity based upon one's ability and
39E.S. Griffith, "The Ethical Foundations of the Public
Interest," p. 22.
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regardless of race, sex, creed, social position or family
wealth. 40 Reuther defined his goals irt more materialistic
terms:
1. Elimination of poverty from our society.
2
.
The opportunity for every person to obtain as much
education as he is able and willing to absorb.
3. The opportunity for every person to make the fullest
use of his native abilities and learned skills, and to
be compensated accordingly.
4. The best possible health care for every person,
regardless of his individual finances.
5. A good home in a decent neighborhood for every family.
6. Adequate recreational and cultural opportunities for
every taste.
7. Clean air and pure water in every community.
8. A steadily rising standard of living for all.
9. A fair share of help for needier peoples.
10. An adequate national defense, physically capable of
deterring aggression, but incorporated into a national
policy of seeking security for America primarily
through the establishment of security for all peoples
through international agreement.
Reuther placed very high priority on the American
dream. He acknowledged a need for defense but fails to
place the importance on it that is necessary. An "adequate"
defense equates to a dangerous and unstable world order.
Besides, without a strong defense there will be no American
dream.
40W.P. Reuther, "Goals for America," p. 62
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For President Reagan, "The American Dream is a song
of hope that rings through the night winter air. Vivid,
tender music that warms our hearts when the least among us
aspire to the greatest things—to venture a daring enter-
prise; to unearth new beauty in music, literature, and art;
to discover a new universe inside a tiny silicon chip or a
single human cell." 41
E. SUMMARY/WHAT IS THE NATIONAL INTEREST?
For the purpose of the rest of this study an operational
definition of the national interest will be that of an
instrument of political action in that it is a means of
justifying, denouncing, or proposing policies. Under the
guise of national interests, policy-makers can, for the
purpose of satisfying national needs as defined by proble-
matic context, act in the best interest of the nation. They
do so in a legitimate manner that results in complete demo-
cratic compliance. Democratic compliance (via due process)
and legitimacy are the key elements of any successful
foreign policy.
The American national interest is the protection of our
perceived needs and desires, i.e., the national identity and
core values that make up the essence of what American is.
These include the Declaration of Independence, the Constitu-
tion, the Bill of Rights, and the 10th Federalist Papers.
41The State of the Union Address, 1986
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In order to protect the national interest, America's number
one goal must be a strong national defense. It is only from
a strong strategic position that the United States can hope
to negotiate other interests such as world peace, human
rights and the spreading of world democracy and freedom.
America's security is paramount to the pursuit of the
American Dream. Therefore, the national interest should
take priority over the public interest. Foreign and domes-
tic policy should be formulated with defense in mind. A
strong defense is key to obtaining both national and public
interest goals.
The remainder of this thesis will be argued from the
basis of this definition of the national interest and that
America's number one goal should be to maintain a strong
defense posture in order to pursue its national interests.
Furthermore, any overt conflicts between defense and
economic strength should be decided in favor of their
relative contribution to national security.
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III. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
The main objective of this section of this thesis is to
explore a sample of various theories of technology transfer
and their effects on the Soviet Union.
How these theories are formulated and how the theorist
interprets them has a great deal to do with their individual
mind-set, that is, the perspective one takes when addressing
an issue. The question of mind-set will be explored in the
first part of this section.
The question of technology transfer is as equally
complex as that of the national interest. It differs in
that there is an overabundance of information on the
subject, and separating the wheat from the chaff is quite
difficult.
One might ask the question, "how does technology
transfer relate to the national interest?"
Technology is a key element of defense. It is a primary
tool that is considered when developing American military
strategy to be utilized in defending the nation. Therefore
what the nation does with this technology is of major con-
cern to the policy-maker who formulates foreign policy under
the guise of the national interest. This is especially true
when speaking about technology that is being transferred
directly to the threat, the Soviet Union.
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A. THE AMERICAN MIND-SET
How a policy-maker views a particular policy towards the
Soviet Union depends upon his preconceived notions of the
nature of the Soviet threat. Therefore, although two
policy-makers may be looking at the same Soviet-related
problem, they see different solutions. Charles Wolf attri-
butes such prospective differences to "certain underlying
beliefs or premises concerning the nature of the Soviet
system and the principle objectives, of its leadership." He
calls these mind-sets "mirror-imaging" (MI) and "power-
maximizing" (PM). 42 Wolf does admit this dichotomy is a
bit oversimplified but, nevertheless, it serves as a useful
tool in explaining how different policy-makers view
technology transfer.
1. Mirror- imaging
Those who hold the mirror-imaging view of the Soviet
Union, its system, and leadership, believe that Soviet
aggressiveness, expansionist policy, and militaristic ten-
dencies extend from Great Russian history and culture. That
throughout Russian history they were extremely vulnerable to
attack from outside invaders. They see a need for buffer
territory in order to prevent any future invasion into the
42 Charles Wolf, Jr., "Soviet Economic Stringencies:
External Reactions and Repercussions," a paper prepared for
a symposium on "Soviet Economic Stringencies: Political and
Security Implications," sponsored by the National Defense
University and the Defense Intelligence College, Fort
McNair, Washington, D.C., May 10-11, 1984.
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motherland. This constant vulnerability over a number of
centuries led to an inferiority complex that is present
today. It is for these reasons that the Soviet expansionist
policy exists. Ever since the birth of the Soviet Union in
1917 the Soviet ideology has been under attack from the
West. This just increases Soviet mistrust of the United
States and the West. And finally the lessons of the Great
Patriotic War and the twenty million Soviet lives lost has
taught the Soviets that they must maintain a strong defense.
These are some of the reasons the Soviet Union is a garrison
state.
Those who mirror-image say Ivan selling sausage on the
street in Moscow is just like Charlie selling soft pretzels
in Manhattan. They contest that if the United States is
nice to them and show its good intentions, the Soviet Union
will reciprocate. They believe that the long term goals of
the Soviet Union is much like those of the United States,
that is, "human betterment and well-being, social progress,
peace, prosperity, and justice." That a policy of conces-
sions combined with firmness will at worse produce a
"symmetrical rather than exploitative response from the
Soviet leadership, and perhaps also an irenic evolution of
the Soviet system." 43 According to Wolf the holders of MI
are likely to favor subsidies, increased trade, and various
43 C. Wolf, Jr., "Soviet Economic Stringencies
External Reactions and Repercussions," p. 5.
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forms of credit. This was the whole precept behind detente
in the seventies.
2 . Power-maximizing
Those who hold the power-maximizing point of view
believe that the worse the Soviet economy is the better it
is for the West. The Soviet leadership will have to contend
with a conflict of interest between the competing claims of
the military establishment, domestic economy, and its
outside interests, Eastern Europe, third world, etc. This
conflict may force Soviet leaders into making changes that
will be favorable to the West. 44
Wolf argues that the power-maximizer views the
Soviet Union as an ideological and military adversary of the
West and that East-West economic relations will, at best,
influence Soviet behavior only slightly and gradually. They
believe that Soviet behavior depends on two factors: 45
1. the resources and opportunities available to the
Soviet Union
2. the attitudes, preferences, and priorities of its
leadership.
As indicated below, whether one places himself in
the mirror-imaging or power-maximizing category, or some-
where in between, the thought process that contributes to a
44 C. Wolf, Jr. , "Soviet Economic Stringencies
External Reactions and Repercussions," p. 6.
45C. Wolf, Jr., "Soviet Economic Stringencies
External Reactions and Repercussions," p. 7.
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particular way of viewing the Soviet Union has its basic
roots in traditional American philosophy.
3 . The American Philosophy
American philosophy has a revolutionary flavor much
like the Declaration of Independence. It, too, broke away
from the oppressive hand of a European influence. Tradi-
tional European philosophy framed the questions of, what is
reality and what makes up the universe in either/or terms?
Either reality and the universe are mind or they are matter.
This way of thinking did not apply to America.
Americans were very physical and materialistic people on one
hand and believed in a divine power on the other. American
philosophical thought led by John Dewey contested the
universe is pluralistic. Dewey believed that man is not
matter or mind, but experience. Reality lay in the
concrete, the immediate, and the developing. Art, science,
and religion were all important insofar as each could be
controlled and refined by intelligence. 46 This thought
allowed for the best of both worlds. Americans can have God
and still live a materialistic life. Thus the 1880 's saw
the birth of American pragmatism.
It was this uniqueness that America based its
national interest on. From the 1880' s until the end of the
first world war, the nation rested on a solid foundation of
idealism, reform was the order of the day. World War I and
46H.F. May, The End of American Innocence , p. 147
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its aftermath took its toll on the then American philosophy
of pragmatism. The idealism that was once there is eluding
contemporary America for various reasons. America is now an
ad hoc society. Maybe it is because "fat cats" tend to be
lazy, or maybe it is because latter generations failed to
pass down the precious meaning of what it is to be an
American. 47 America is still in search of this lost
idealism. It is evident in political thought and decision-
making today. This is where the tie between American
philosophy and technology transfer policy lies.
B . SUMMARY
The American mind-set is a key element that determines
what approach one follows along the way to answering the
technology transfer question. If one adheres to the power-
maximizing approach, they are more apt to take the hard-line
stance on any question regarding the Soviet Union. Those
advocating the mirror-imaging approach may be more willing
to extend to the Soviet Union every possible benefit of the
doubt. The American Philosophy helps explain the tendencies
Americans have toward a soft-liner approach to the Soviet
question including the transferring of technology.
It would be a grave mistake to place decision-makers in
this either/or position. Nevertheless these categories
47The idea of latter generations failing to pass down
the meaning of what it is to be an American is that of Dr.
Frank Teti, a professor of National Security Affairs, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
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serve as a useful tool for the reader in that it enables one
to see what approach a policy-maker may have taken when
making a decision. With this perspective in mind, the
questions regarding technology and the U.S. national
security will be explored.
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IV. TECHNOLOGY AND US NATIONAL SECURITY
The question of how important is technology to the
United States and more specifically the U.S. military-
industrial complex and the national security is a primary
issue confronting the opportunity cost of technology
transfer to the Soviet Union. Two critical concepts will be
addressed in the section below. They are technology and
national security. Therefore it is imperative to define
both. First a definition of technology.
A. DEFINING TECHNOLOGY
"Technology is not science and it is not products.
Technology is the application of science to the manufacture
of products and services. It is the specific know-how
required to define a product that fulfills need, to design
the product, and to manufacture it. The product is the end
result of this technology, but it is not technology." 48
Technology transfer is the moving of technology from one
place to another.
J. Fred Bucy describes a technology in a similar
fashion: "A clear distinction should be maintained between
48Maurice Mountain, "The Continuous Complexities of
Technology Transfer," p. 8, as presented in National
Security and Technology Transfer: The Strategic Dimensions
of. East-West Trade , Gary K. Bertsch and John R. Mclntyre
editors; (Westview Press, 1983)
.
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science, technology, and products. Science is the syste-
matic pursuit of knowledge, while technology is the
application of that knowledge to the production of specific
goods and services. Technology is the design and manufac-
ture know-how required to produce goods. It is the hundreds
of detailed steps necessary to manufacture products to meet
specific needs. Products, therefore, are the results of
technology; and while science is almost always the basis of
technology, it, also, is not technology." 49
B. DEFINING NATIONAL SECURITY
Defining national security is a bit more complex. Every
nation is tasked to preserve its national character. This
may include a certain standard of living, religious and
political freedoms, history and traditions, self-
sufficiency, protection from enemies, or anything a nation
characterizes its national interests to be. The national
security is a plan whose purpose is to protect the national
interest from its perceived threats. In the United States,
the threat is countered through the maintenance of a strong
and capable political and military system. The two do not
always work in unison. In fact they tend, by their very
nature, to contradict each other. For this reason, national
49J. Fred Bucy, "Technology Transfer and East-West
Trade: A Reappraisal," p. 200, as presented in National
Security and Technology Transfer: The Strategic Dimensions
of East-West Trade . Gary K. Bertsch and John R. Mclntyre
editors; (Westview Press, 1983).
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security policy is most often not the product of rationale,
or in keeping with what is best for the national interest.
The Department of Defense defines the national security
as being the condition provided by: 50
1. a military or defense advantage over any foreign
nation or group of nations, or
2. a favorable foreign relations position, or
3. a defense posture capable of successfully resisting
hostile or destructive action from within or without,
overt or covert.
With those two definitions in mind, the question of the
worth of technology to the United States can be pursued.
Technology is important to the United States for many
reasons. At the conclusion of the second world war the
United States was thrown into a role of a world super power
and policeman. There was no military or economic equal.
Militarily the United States was afforded a nuclear monopoly
for a short time and even when that monopoly ended there was
a clear Western strategic advantage. Economically the
United States was in a golden position with the Bretton
Woods monetary system. It was as Dickens put it, "the best
of times and the worst of times." The United States came
out of the war in the best shape of all the allies. With
the good fortune came the responsibility, the isolationist
policy would be no more, although the attitude of being an
island still remains in the American people. This is one of
50M. Mountain, "The Continuing Complexities of
Technology Transfer," p. 8.
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the reasons it is so difficult to maintain a strong military
posture that is able to protect the national interest. That
is why the technological advantage the US has over the
Soviet Union is so important.
The Soviet Union has made it a two horse race. There
are now the "global powers," two countries able to project
power anywhere on the face of the earth. The USSR has
rivaled the United States in strategic might, surpassed the
U.S. in conventional might and is knocking on the door of
our sea cabin. The short of it all is that the Soviet Union
holds an advantage in the numbers. Parity is maintained by
the United States' clear technological superiority. The
Soviet Union can not compete with U.S. technology and the
United States would be hard pressed to compete with a
garrison state in force and weapons size. Former Secretary
of Defense Brown, in testifying before Congress in support
of the Fiscal Year 1979 Defense budget, stated, "We rely
increasingly on the sophistication of our equipment to
compensate for potential superiority in enemy numbers." 51
The question of just how important is the transfer of
U.S. technology to the Soviet Union can be argued in
different ways. Economically speaking, the Soviet Union is
another market. Not selling technology to the Soviets would
mean a loss of revenue to U.S. businesses. They may argue
51M. Mountain, "The Continuing Complexities of
Technology Transfer," p. 9.
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that no matter how small the profits, it is still money in
the bank and in keeping with the United States' free trade
policies. Besides, if American companies do not sell to the
Soviets, the West Germans, Japanese, Italians, or French
will.
West Germany is the largest single supplier of Western
technology to the Soviet Union. In 1980, 6.2% of Germany's
foreign trade was with communist countries, of which the
Soviet Union is the most important. 52 Politically for the
West Germans, it is important to maintain good relations
with the Soviets, not just for security reasons, but because
the Soviets will allow them closer ties with the East
Germans. This is just one example of how a NATO allies'
national interest conflicts with that of the United States.
Politically for the United States some argue that a friendly
policy of technology transfer with the Soviets will ease
overall superpower tension. This was the basic theory
behind detente.
After considering the above arguments, it is clear that
the major importance of technology lies in its strategic
significance. As long as U.S. strategic policy is based
upon the possessed technological advantage its weapons have
over the Soviets, and as long as a strategic doctrine
52M. Mountain, "The Continuing Complexities of
Technology Transfer," p. 22.
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dictates a come-as-you-are war, the importance of technology
can not be overemphasized.
C . SUMMARY
Technology may very well be the United States' manifest
destiny. As America moves from an industry-oriented economy
to a service-oriented nation, technology plays an ever
increasing role in the well-being of this sovereignty. The
linkage between technology and U.S. National Security is
strong. Maintaining a technological edge over the Soviet
Union is paramount to survival of the keeper of democracy.
It is clear that there is a positive relationship
between technology and U.S. national security. The role
Western technology plays in enhancing the capabilities of
the Soviet defense industry will be addressed in the next
chapter.
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V. WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND THE SOVIET DEFENSE INDUSTRY
The purpose of foreign trade is to maximize a nation's
income without adversely impacting its national security.
For the vast majority of cases this is not a problem. Trade
with one's allies is deemed mutually beneficial, and trade
with one's adversary usually has built-in governmental regu-
lations that ensure transfer agreements do not conflict with
national security. This is not the case across the board.
A problem arises when transferring technology. There are no
clear choices since in many instances the apparent military
value, or lack of it, is not easily noticeable. 53
This chapter will explore the manner in which technology
affects the Soviet Union; how technology figures in their
foreign and domestic policies and their plan for economic
growth, and by what ways they acquire the technology needed
to feed their military machine or maintain a favorable
domestic climate.
The Soviet Union is greatly concerned about fighting two
kinds of battles with the United States that they could not
possibly win. One is economic battle and the other is
technological battle.
53J. F. Bucy, "Technology Transfer and East-West Trade
A Reappraisal," p. 199.
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Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is both a technologi-
cal and economic battle in which the Soviets could not hope
to successfully compete and/or win. Their only chance would
be to acquire the technology covertly, and with great strain
to their economy proceed with development at the expense of
domestic well-being and possible other areas of their mili-
tary. The Soviets counter economic or technological warfare
with a propaganda strategy designed to end the war before it
can do any real damage to them. Vernon Aspaturian gives a
good example of the successful utilization of this strategy.
"In the face of Soviet complaints and mild threats, Jimmy
Carter had canceled the B-l bomber, vetoed construction of
another attack carrier, decided not to build the neutron
bomb (after pressuring European leaders to publicly accept
it even at some cost in terms' of their internal political
support) , and retreated on the whole host of issues
connected with the SALT II agreements, including matters
connected with the cruise missile, the Backfire bomber, ICBM
ceilings, and verification capabilities." 54 It is obvious
why the Soviet Union does not desire to get into an arms
race with the United States. According to a CIA report the
Soviets spend as much as 13-14 percent of their GNP for
54Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Global Power and the
Correlation of Forces," p. 7, Problems of Communism , May-
June 1980.
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defense. 55 Another source estimates Soviet defense
spending somewhere between 11 and 15 percent of their
GNP. 56 Spending of this nature puts an enormous strain on
the Soviet economy, a reason Gorbachev has reiterated over
and over his desire to halt the arms race. 57
What is less obvious is the impact that Western tech-
nology has on their economy, and in particular their mili-
tary-industrial complex. There is no question that the
Soviet Union places the acquisition of Western technology in
high esteem and they have for some time. As far back as the
1930' s, the Soviets have expended enormous amounts of its
resources, both financial and human, for the purpose of
acquiring Western technology for just one purpose—that is
to enhance its military capabilities and improve the effi-
ciency of its military-industrial technology. 58 The Soviet
military leaders place a high emphasis on the importance of
technology. According to Marshall Ogarkov, "The development
of production and the level of science and technology
55Abram Bergson, "Gorbachev Calls For Intensive
Growth," Challenge , p. 14, November-December, 1985.
56Carl Gershman, "Our Technology to Russia for Profit,"
Business and Society Review , p. 34, Winter 1979-1980.
57A. Bergson, "Gorbachev Calls For Intensive Growth,"
p. 14.
58Central Intelligence Agency, "Soviet Acquisition of
Western Technology," p. 92, as presented in National
Security and Technology Transfer: The Strategic Dimensions
of East-West Trade . Gary K. Bertsch and John R. Mclntyre
editors; (Westview Press, 1983).
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determine the level of weapons technology. This, along with
the size and type of population, has a direct influence on
manning and organization of the armed forces and on methods




According to a U.S. News and World Report article that
quoted the contents of a CIA-summarized top-secret
intelligence study for Congress, the Soviet Union is making
an all-out effort to acquire technology in ten critical
areas in which they lag behind the United States. 60 These
areas are as follows:
1. Guidance technology . This not only includes missile
guidance technology that ensures ballistic missile
accuracy, but also navigation technology. The Soviets
place a specific emphasis on submarine navigation, a
prerequisite for accurate sub-launched ballistic
missiles.
2. Rocket propulsion . This is primarily in the area of
solid rocket propulsion technology.
3. Missile defense . The Soviets are interested in
enhancing their means to detect hostile missile,
delineate between warheads and decoys, and process
radar-derived targets for use by their defensive
missiles.
4. Aircraft technology . The Soviets are primarily inter-





59Harriet Fast Scott, and William F. Scott, The Soviet
Art of War: Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics , p. 88,
Westview Press, Inc., 1982.
60nThe High-Tech Secrets Russia Seeks in West," U.S.
News and World Report , p. 44, May 3, 1985.
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6. Antisubmarine warfare . The United States has a clear
advantage in ASW. The Soviet Union would like to
narrow this gap.
7. Submarine quieting . A quieter submarine makes the ASW
problem more difficult.
8. Large carriers . The Soviet Union is designing and
building large aircraft carriers for the possible pur-
pose of giving their Navy a power projection role.
9. Computer equipment . Computer technology is applicable
to all aspects of Soviet military development.
10. Smart bombs . The Soviet Union is interested in smart
bombs because of their application to anti-tank
warfare.
The Soviets have been very successful in acquiring
Western technology by a combination of legal and illegal
means. 61 Legally the Soviets acquire Western technology
through open literature, legal trade channels, and student,
scientific, and technical exchange programs. Legal trade
channels tend to benefit the Soviet Union over the United
States. Undersecretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering, Dr. William Perry, explains, "The scale of
technology to the Soviet Union has been of relatively small
benefit to the Western world, but of very great benefit to
the Soviet Union—both directly and indirectly assisting
their military objectives." 62 Dr. Miles Costick, Director
of the Institute on Strategic Trade in Washington, takes the
problem one step further. "It is virtually impossible to
61Central Intelligence Agency, "Soviet Acquisition of
Western Technology," p. 93.
62
"U.S. Builds Soviet War Machine," Industrial Research
and Development , July 1980, p. 54.
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identify a single industry in the USSR which manufactures
only civilian goods." 63 Mills brings up an important
question of dual use technology, i.e., technology that can
be applied to both military and civilian use. There is no
doubt that the Soviet Union's priorities are to filter
acquired technology into the military sector. According to
a CIA study, dual-use technology "almost always finds its
way first into military industry, and subsequently into the
civilian sectors of industries that support military
production. Thus, Soviet assurance that legally purchased
dual-use technology will be used solely for civilian appli-
cations can seldom be accepted at face value." 64
On the illegal side, there is a major and increasing
problem of the most advanced Western technology being
acquired by clandestine means. One theory is that this
acquired technology has a significant impact on the Soviet
defense industry. William Smits, Jr., a supervisor special
agent with the FBI in San Francisco, who has recently com-
pleted a doctoral dissertation on High Technology Transfer
to the Soviet Union and East-bloc countries, contests that
there are immense savings to the Soviet defense industry as
a result of reverse-engineering and outright theft. He
further states, "These acquisitions are incorporated into
Soviet strategic, aircraft, naval and tactical systems, as
63
"U.S. Builds Soviet War Machine," p. 54.
64
"Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology," p. 94
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well as microelectronic and computer systems. During the
past 10 years the Soviets have acquired sufficient micro-
electronic equipment to meet almost 100 percent of the needs
of their military forces and 50 percent of their overall
microelectronic needs." 65
How much overall did the Soviet Union benefit from
Western technology acquired legally and illegally, including
by clandestine means? According to the CIA, it was quite
significant. The legal and illegal acquisition program has
allowed the Soviet Union to:
1. Save hundreds of millions of dollars in R&D costs, and
years in R&D development lead time.
2. Modernize critical sectors of their military industry
and reduce engineering risks by following or copying
proven Western designs, thereby limiting the rise in
their military production costs.
3. Achieve greater weapons performance than if they rely
solely on their own technology.
4
.
Incorporate countermeasures to Western weapons early
in the development of their own weapons programs.
Thane Gustafson paints an equally grim picture as to the
impact Western technology has on the Soviet Union.
Gustafson believes imported Western technology could lead
the Soviets into a position where they could have a short-
term military advantage in two ways. The first is a techno-
logical transfer that leads directly to a revolutionary
breakthrough; and the second is a transfer "that suddenly
65Ken Kovacs, "Soviet Spies Steal Silicon Valley
Secrets," Golden Gate Magazine , Winter 86, Vol. xiv, no. 1,
p. 3 .
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fills a gap, overcomes a bottle-neck, or completes a puzzle
in an otherwise mature Soviet technology, enabling the
Soviets to proceed to a sudden generational improvement in a
major weapons system." 66
Some specific examples of Western technology having a
significant impact on Soviet military/weapon design can be
seen in the Soviet AWACS, space shuttle, SU-15 fighter, the
Blackjack bomber, and the AA-2 Atoll and the SA-7 Grail
missiles.
According to Edgar Ulsamer, "The Soviet AA-2 Atoll
family of air-to-air missiles ... is copied from the US
AIM-9 Sidewinder missile. The Soviet SA-7 Grail surface-to-
air missile is clearly derived from the US Army's hand-held
Redeye antiaircraft weapon." 67 There are also close simi-
larities between the Soviet Blackjack bomber and the older
B-1A. 68 Ulsamer further argues that "The SU-AWACS is
strikingly similar to the Air Force's E-3A AWACS." 69
Evan Thomas of Time Magazine is equally as convinced of
similarities between Soviet and U.S. weapons systems. He
66Thane Gustafson, "Effects and Dangers of Technology
Transfer," p. 113, as presented in National Security and
Technology Transfer: The Strategic Dimensions of East-West
Trade, Gary K. Bertsch and John R. Mclntyre editors;
(Westview Press, 1983)
.
67Edgar Ulsamer, "Moscow's Technology Parasites," Air
Force Magazine , December 1984, p. 54.
68 E. Ulsamer, "Moscow's Technology Parasites," p. 54.
69E. Ulsamer, "Moscow's Technology Parasites," p. 54.
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states, "The Soviet AWACS and space shuttles are carbon
copies of earlier U.S. models . . . and . . . The SU-15
fighter that shot down the Korean Airline's Flight 007 two
years ago did so with a missile guidance system designed in
the U.S." 70
A report given before the Hearing Before the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Govern-
mental Affairs, United States Senate, stated that there are
hundreds of examples of Soviet military equipment and
weapons of the 1980' s and 1990' s that have benefited or will
benefit from the products and technologies of at least a
dozen different Western countries. 71 For the field of
aviation alone these include: 72
Four new fighter aircraft





70Evan Thomas, "Moles Who Burrow for Microchips," Time
Magazine , June 17, 1985, p. 25.
71
"Soviet Acquisition of Military Significant Western
Technology: An Update," April 1982, p. 31. Exhibit No. 1,
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States
Senate, Ninety-Seventh Congress, Second Session, 4,5,6,11,
and 12 May 1982.
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"Soviet Acquisition of Military Significant Western





Air-to-air missile (US Phoenix-like)
Fire-control system for three fighters
Gas turbine engine
Ramjet engine
The Soviet Union acquires much of Western technology
directly by approaching individuals closely related to
specific weapons systems research and development and
exploiting their weaknesses, whether it be an economic
problem or something the individual wants to hide such as
homosexuality. This tactic enables the USSR to stay abreast
of technological development as it is happening, which in
turn speeds up assimilation of this technology into their
own systems, thus reducing the time lag between a U.S. and
Soviet-like weapons system. It also allows the Soviet Union
means to evaluate the capabilities and limitations of the
most advanced U.S. weapons. This greatly enhances their
ability to develop counter weapons to defeat the U.S.
systems.
An example of this tactic can be seen in the case of
William H. Bell, a radar project engineer at Hughes
Aircraft. Bell was approached by a Polish intelligence
officer who befriended him. One thing led to another and
soon Bell accepted much needed financial assistance enabling
63
him to afford a down payment on a condominium. Over a three
year period Bell received $110,000 in return for information
on such systems as the Patriot, surface-to-air missile, a
NATO air defense system, and the Phoenix air-to-air missile
carried on the Navy's F-14 fighter. According to Richard
Perle, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Policy, "The most important material Bell handed
over to the Eastern Bloc was on the look-down, shoot-down
radar system of the F-15 fighter—a major advance in
avionics which permits the aircraft to distinguish low-
flying objects from ground clutter." 73
The counter argument to the great role Western
technology plays in the Soviet defense industry is
articulated by Julian Cooper. Cooper's thesis is that
although undeniably the Soviet defense industry has benefit-
ed by successfully exploiting acquisitions of Western tech-
nology in the form of accelerated weapons development, to
what extent they have benefited has been greatly exagger-
ated. Cooper argues that this acquisition of technology is
done on a selective basis, and always with the strategy in
mind of not becoming dependent on the West for technology.
73Richard Perle, "Technology and the Quiet War,"
Strategic Review . Winter 1983, p. 34.
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Furthermore, he states that the assimilation of Western
technology has not been "either trouble- or cost-free." 74
Bruce Parrott agrees with Cooper's view on the Soviet
Union's approach to acquiring Western technology and its
impact. Parrott argues, "More than most Western critics of
technology transfers to the Soviet Union realize, the
regime's attempts to avoid ideological contamination from
the West have hampered its efforts to absorb Western techni-
cal knowledge." 75
Cooper sums up the -feelings of the school of thought
that believes a detente-like relationship with the Soviet
Union is best for the superpowers and the world as a whole.
Cooper argues, "It cannot be ruled out that in the future,
not only Western security, but also the survival of
humanity, may be best served by tolerance of broad East-West
military technological parity in the framework of mutually
agreed quantitative arms limitations, with a depoliticiza-
tion of the whole issue of technology transfer." 76
74Julian Cooper, "Western Technology and the Soviet
Defense Industry," p. 197, as presented in Trade, Tech-
nology, and Soviet-American Relations , Indiana University
Press, 1985.
75Bruce Parrott, "Technology and the Soviet System,"
Current History , October, 1983, p. 328.
76J. Cooper, "Western Technology and the Soviet Defense
Industry," p. 197.
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A. TECHNOLOGY AND SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH
Consider the assumption that what is good for the Soviet
economy is good for the defense industry. The next logical
question might be, just what impact does Western technology
have on Soviet economic growth? Unlike in the United
States, a strong and prosperous economy equates to a more
burden-free and strong military apparatus. There is no
constituency in which to sell the defense budget. It seems
no matter how economically oppressed the average Soviet
citizen is, he still seems to realize the necessity of main-
taining a strong defensive posture in order to protect the
"motherland." There are enough Soviets around that person-
ally remember the Great Patriotic War. Besides, as long as
the economy shows improvement, no matter how small, the
Soviet citizen is reminded that the socialist system works.
There is no doubt though, that maintaining a strong defense
takes its toll. Soviet General-Lieutenant I. Zavyalov
expressed the dilemma this way, "As military affairs develop
they make higher demands of the economy. Not only in terms
of the quantity and quality of arms and equipment, but also
with respect to the full-time defense industry and to
raising the readiness of other industries to switch onto a
military footing, rationally siting production capabili-
ties, and insuring the survival of economic centers." 77
77Mark E. Miller, "The Role of Western Technology in
Soviet Strategy," Orbis, Fall, 1978, p. 549.
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Therefore, it is imperative to briefly entertain the
question, how does Western technology impact the Soviet
economy?
There is considerable empirical evidence that Western
technology only marginally affects the Soviet Union. Mark
E. Miller explains that in the inadequate Soviet machine-
building sector, in 1976, machinery imports from the West
amounted to in excess of $4.2 billion or 36.5 percent of
total capitalist exports to the USSR. 78 This led Miller to
reasonably expect Western technology to have a great impact
on Soviet economic growth. According to Miller, a recent
study by Donald Green and Herbert Levine concluded that
between 1968 and 1973 Western machinery added slightly more
than 1 percent to overall Soviet economic growth and 2.5
percent to industrial growth. 79
To sum up Miller's thesis, he believes, "Soviet invest-
ment in Western technology is rather small, and total impact
on the Soviet economy is modest. At the same time, the
effect on Western technology on certain sectors has been
substantial, raising both productivity and the quality of
output." Further he contests, that Western technology
serves as a "quick fix" for the technologically critical
industries and basic strength of the Soviet economy. The
78M.E. Miller, "The Role of Western Technology in
Soviet Strategy, p. 554.
79M.E. Miller, "The Role of Western Technology in
Soviet Strategy," p. 55.
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precious hard currency they spend on technology is well
thought out and needed to augment their other than consumer
sector, the military. 80
Although Western technology does not greatly impact
Soviet growth, it does impact their critical industries. 81
B . SUMMARY
Without question technology is key to the maintenance of
the Soviet war machine. The USSR needs advance technology
to ensure that the technological gap between the United
States and the Soviet Union does not increase. There is
also the possibility, as Thane Gustafson points out, that
acquired Western technology can lead directly to a revolu-
tionary breakthrough or it may suddenly fill a gap, overcome
a bottleneck, or complete a puzzle that Soviet technology
alone could not do.
The question, how does Western technology affect Soviet
economic growth, can be answered quite briefly. It has a
negligible impact.
Up until this point of this study three critical obser-
vations can be made. One, a defense is imperative to a
successful pursuit of the national interest; two, technology
80M.E. Miller, "The Role of Western Technology in
Soviet Strategy," p. 558.
81It is difficult to say how significant is the impact
on critical Soviet industries. There is much room for
empirical review on this aspect of Western technology and
Soviet economic growth.
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is a key element of U.S. National Security; and three, that
the acquisition of Western technology is deemed crucial to
the Soviet defense industry and the Soviet Union benefits
greatly by it.
The next two chapters of this thesis will examine the
area of the Third World military-industrial complex and the
Soviet Union's arms trade with the Third World. The purpose
of this exercise is to see if there is any linkage between
Western technology and the Third World defense infrastruc-
ture that may prove to have a beneficial effect for the
Soviet Union.
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VI. THE THIRD WORLD ARMS TRADE AND ARMS INDUSTRY
The maintenance of a military is important to Third
World nations for various reasons. Probably the foremost
motivator that prompts all nations to establish a military
and maintain an adequate defense posture is the perceived
external threat.
The perceived threat provides the motivation, but how
large, well-equipped, and trained a nation's military is
depends largely on the resources at its disposal, along with
a commitment to maintain a strong defense posture.
Categorizing Third World nations can be difficult,
although a useful way to look at them is as those nations
that produce arms indigenously (producers) , and those that
do not produce arms (non-producers) . A few examples of
Third World nations that manufacture their own arms are
Israel, India, Brazil, Egypt, South Korea, and Argentina.
The Third World defense industries and their association
with Soviet technology will be examined in this chapter.
The pursuit of this subject is important to the development
of this chapter because even indigenous arms producers do
not produce one hundred percent of the weapons that they
need. In some cases much of the additional arms is obtained
from the Soviet Union. For example, India produces Soviet-
designed weapons via license. The possibility that Soviet
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technology has been incorporated in the indigenous produc-
tion of some Third World area will be explored. To do this
it is necessary to understand the role of Third World arms
producers in order to establish a link, or lack thereof,
between Western technology to the Third World arms industry
via the Soviet Union as the middle-man. This feasibly can
happen either through arms exports that assimilated Western
technology or by cooperative joint ventures such as licenses
that allow production or arms that have Western technology
assimilated into them. If this hypothesis is proven to be
true, the Soviet Union benefits twice from acquired Western
technology. First in their initial use of Western
technology and second from the hard currency it earns from
the arms sales to a Third World client. On the other hand,
the Third World nation benefits from Western technology not
only in the product it buys but also if through its own
indigenous production via license or reverse-engineering.
The preceding link to the national interest is that they
undermine national defense, an element paramount to obtain-
ing both national and public interest goals.
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Third World arms production is not a new concept. As
early as the 19th century both warships and small arms were
produced in Egypt, India and some of the Latin American
71
countries. 82 Those countries lost their competitiveness at
the turn of the century when they began to lag behind the
industrializing countries in terms of new methods of steel
production and high-precision manufacturing. 83 Arms
production in the Third World began to increase in the
1930 's due primarily to unrest in Europe and was signifi-
cantly accelerated during World War II. After World War II
technology began to play an ever-increasing role in the
field of arms production. Weapons systems became increas-
ingly more sophisticated. The technological gap was widened
even further between the industrialized countries and the
Third World because of advances made during the war. This
gap is accountable for all, but limiting a few Third World
nations, such as Argentina and Egypt, and to a lesser degree
Colombia, India and North Korea to producing primarily only
naval vessels during the 1950' s. This production, although
limited, was growing. 84
The first half of the sixties carried the same slow
growth and limited production as that of the 1950' s.
Although, the second half of the 1960's revealed an increase
82Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, Arms Production in
the Third World , p. 7, edited by Michael Brzoska and Thomas
Ohlson, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
Taylor and Francis, London and Philadelphia, 1986.
83M. Brzoska and T. Ohlson, Arms Production in the
Third World , p. 9.
84M. Brzoska and T. Ohlson, Arms Production in the
Third World , p. 7.
72
in growth with the addition of Brazil, Israel, and South
Africa to the numbers of producers. 85 This increase in
growth was to last until the 1980 's, simultaneously with the
halting in the growth of arms trade with the Third World. 86
According to M. Brzoska and T. Ohlson, "Growth in production
came to a halt in the 1980' s, at the same time as the arms
trade with the Third World ceased to grow. The main expla-
nations for both changes in trend are the same: first, the
global economic crisis limited arms procurement budgets in
most countries; and second, some countries felt the effects
of a saturation in weapons which had been produced indigen-
ously or purchased from abroad in the 1970' s." 87
B. THE PERCEIVED THREAT
The perceived threat may be generated from within as in
the case of a government lacking in legitimacy using a
military to maintain control, or externally, from the threat
of a rivaling neighbor. The perceived threat may also be a
combination of the two. Edward A. Kolodziej and Robert E.
Harkavy link the perceived threat with a multi-factored
85M. Brzoska and T. Ohlson, Arms Production in the
Third World , p. 7.
86M. Brzoska and T. Ohlson, Arms Production in the
Third World , p. 7.
87M. Brzoska and T. Ohlson, Arms Production in the
Third World , p. 7.
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approach that influences the development of a security
policy. Their approach is as follows: 88
Inputs to the Development of Security Policy
A. Internal




3. Economic development: agriculture; industry; skill
of labor force; trade and commerce; research and
deve 1opment ; etc .
.
4. Government structure and regime politics: civil-
military relations; inter-service rivalry; bureau-
cratic politics, etc.




2. Global and regional security systems; distribution
of military power; alignments and alliances;
actors; nation-states, international organizations,
transnational groups.
3. Global and regional economic systems (dependent,
independent, interdependent) domains: monetary;
trade; investment; resource distribution, etc.
4 Adversary relations and issues
All of the above enter into the perceived threat
equation.
The perceived threat may be the greatest motivator in a
Third World nation deciding to import arms as well as
88Edward A. Kolodziej and Robert E. Harkavy, Security
Policies of Developing Countries , D.C. Heath and Company,
Lexington Massachusetts, 1982, p. 17.
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produce arms. Other variables associated with the arms
production decision-making process may include one or all of
the following: unstable military security relationships and
alliances; vulnerability to manipulation by exporters;
national pride; employment in high technology; technological




C. THE PRO'S AND CON'S OF ARMS PRODUCTION
Arms production can be viewed as having a beneficial or
adverse effect on a Third World nation. The issue of
defense expenditures is at the core of the pluses and
minuses of any argument. A basic question that needs to be
addressed is whether or not defense spending is beneficial
to a nation. According to a Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco weekly letter, in the United States alone, growth
in defense spending may have been responsible for as much as
10 to 2 percent of total economic growth in California
during 1984. This accounted for the creation of 7,500 addi-
tional jobs. 90 This is one point of view in a very
89G.M. Steinberg, "Israel: High Technology Roulette,"
p. 163, as presented in Arms Production in the Third World ,
edited by Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, Taylor and Francis,
London and Philadelphia, 1985.
90Kristin Hotti and Carolyn Sherwood-Call, "The
Contract Defense Industry in the West," Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco, Weekly Letter, March 28, 1986.
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controversial subject. If true, how does defense spending
impact Third World nations?
There tends to be a common belief throughout the world
that social and military development by their very nature
are opposites. 91 Some scholars believe that the purpose of
government is to first feed, clothe, educate, rid the nation
of disease, and ensure employment opportunities, before
spending money on defense. This line of thought insinuates
that defense expenditures prevent Third World governments
from performing their just duties. In brief, "resources
devoted to defense cannot be employed elsewhere." 92 David
K. Whynes cites an example of the results when a nation
places defense priorities before the basic needs of the
people. Whynes states, "In the Philippines in 1974, some
15,000 persons died violently, of whom perhaps one-half were
killed in civil disturbances. Primarily as a result of
these disturbances, annual military expenditures have more
than quadrupled since 1972, whilst the armed forces have
tripled in size. On the health front, however, the
statistics paint a different picture. In the same year,
28,000 persons died of tuberculosis, 46,000 from pneumonia
91Bruce E. Arlinghaus, "Social versus Military
Development: Positive and Normative Dimensions," p. 39, as
presented in Arms Production in Developing Countries , James
Everet Katz, editor, D.C. Heath, Lexington, Massachusetts,
1984.
92 David K. Whynes, The Economics of Third World
Military Expenditure , University of Texas Press, Austin,
1979, p. 115.
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and 13,000 from nutritional deficiencies, diseases all of
which are associated with poor living conditions, inadequate
food and, in general with poverty . . . The moral is clear;
guns kill in more ways than one." 93
This line of reasoning is echoed in the words of Lance
Taylor. Taylor argues that, "... arms spending has strong
effects on the evolution of the economy, mostly of an
unfavorable sort." 94 He believes that defense spending in
many parts of the Third World buys little security. Taylor
contributes much of the negative effects that defense
spending has on a nation to the numerous wars in the Third
World and the devastating effects they have on their
economies. For example, he sites Kampuchea, Bangladesh,
Uganda, and Nigeria as countries in the 1970 's that
"suffered devastating famines—equivalent in economic terms
to the loss of several years' GNP growth—that were direct
results of wars. If this trend of the last decade
continues, the 1980' s arms effort of the Third World may
bring all economic programs to a devastating halt." 95 Those
scholars who support this school of thought are not without
nemesis.
93 D.K. Whynes, The Economics of Third World Military
Expenditure
, p. 152.
94Lance Taylor, "Military Economics in the Third
World," a paper prepared for the Independent Commission on
Disarmament and Security Issues, October 1981, p. 7A.




In a study by Robert E. Looney and P.C. Frederiksen in
which they reexamined the relationship between growth and
defense spending in developing countries, they concluded
that, among resource constrained nations, the relationship
between military expenditures and economic growth was sta-
tistically insignificant. Their results yielded a positive
linkage between growth and military expenditures for the
unconstrained group of nations. 96
It is very difficult to make broad generalizations of
the Third World in regard to defense expenditures. A more
appropriate way to address the subject is to Lilliputianize
the concept of the Third World. One way to do this is to
address the Third World in the terms of subgroups such as
arms producers and non-producers, or resource constrained
and non-constrained. Another way to address the subject is
to explore the effects of Third World defense expenditures
on a case by case basis.
D. ARMS PRODUCERS
According to Brozoska and Ohlson there is a definite
linkage between arms production and civilian production, and
there are two factors that must be present for successful
large-scale arms production. These are the existence of a
96Robert E. Looney and P.C. Frederiksen, "Defense
Expenditures, External Public Debt and Growth in Developing
Countries," Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California
93943-5000, p. 15.
78
sufficiently large and differentiated industrial base, and a
substantial domestic military market. 97
E. ARMS PRODUCTION VS. ARMS IMPORTS
The primary motivation for arms production should be as
a substitute for arms imports. 98 This may not be the case
where Third World nations are concerned. There has been a
slow but steady increase in the percentage of arms
production to arms imports in the Third World during the
1960 's. This percentage leveled off in the 1970 's to the
point of 10 percent of arms imports. 99 This trend is
explained by the substantial increases in arms imports in
countries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Syria
that counter the effects of increased Third World arms
production. 100 According to Brzoska and Ohlson, "For the
early 1980 's, there is again an upward trend. (By compari-
son, it is estimated that about 95 percent of the U.S. and
Soviet weapon inventories are produced domestically; the
corresponding share for medium-size industrialized countries
is around 70-80 percent; and for countries like Austria,
97M. Brzoska and T. Ohlson, Arms Production in the
Third World , p. 28.
98M. Brzoska and T. Ohlson, Arms Production in the
Third World , p. 27.
99M. Brzoska and T. Ohlson, Arms Production in the
Third World , p. 28.
100M. Brzoska and T. Ohlson, Arms Production i the
Third World , p. 28.
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is around 70-80 percent; and for countries like Austria,
Sweden and Switzerland, the share is estimated at 40-60
percent). 101 Further they argue, in regard to Third World
nations, " . . . it is not the countries with the highest
production values that have become least dependent on arms
imports." 102
There are many factors that may drive a nation to
produce its own arms. One reason may be because arms
production is a source of pride. Another is fear of having
an arms supply or parts cut off. This was certainly a major
consideration in South Africa's decision to become an arms
producer.
After World War II, the South African Afrikaner regime
developed its own arms industry because, firstly, it foresaw
the possibility of arms imports being cut off as a protest
of their policy of apartheid by Western suppliers and poten-
tial United Nations embargoes, and secondly, the creation of
an arms industry was perceived as one way to rectify the
historic Afrikaans-English-speaking imbalance in terms of
ownership of industry. 103 The development of an arms
101M. Brzoska and T. Ohlson, Arms Production in the
Third World , p. 28.
102M. Brzoska and T. Ohlson, Arms Production in the
Third World , p. 28.
103Timothy M. Shaw and Lee Dowdy, "South Africa," p.
318, as presented in Security Policies of Developing
Countries , D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington Massachusetts,
1982.
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industry was further seen as an enhancement to South
Africa's technological base. 104
South Africa has developed a defense and strategic base
in the areas of conventional arms, nuclear weapons, and
indigenous energy production. 105 They have been very
successful in their arms industry endeavor. According to
Lewis Gann and Peter Duignan, "The defense complex,
including ARMSCOR (Arms Corporation of South Africa Limited)
with its subsidiary arms factories, is one of the country's
most advanced technical organizations, one that is engaged
in manufacturing, operating and maintaining a wide range of
highly sophisticated equipment. About 45% of defense
expenditures goes to internal development . . . South
Africa's industrial infrastructure enabled the country to
emphasize self-sufficiency in arms production and improve-
ment in its ability to withstand foreign economic pressures.
11IO6
• • •
The reasons that Israel created an arms industry are
similar to South Africa in that it felt itself vulnerable to
the manipulation of exporters. However, that was not the
only reason. According to G.M. Steinberg, "Israel's
security, its relative international isolation and the
104T.M. Shaw and L. Dowdy, "South Africa," p. 318.
105T.M. Shaw and L. Dowdy, "South Africa," p. 318.
106T.M. Shaw and L. Dowdy, "South Africa," p. 318.
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absence of reliable military allies have together provided




Israel has fought six wars since its independence in
1948. A common theme present throughout all those wars was
a difficulty in obtaining arms externally. There have been
arms embargoes laid upon Israel since its rebirth. And the
United States, Israel's chief external arms supplier, has
delayed arms sales in lieu of political concessions on
numerous occasions. 108 On each occasion of a delay or
embargo, Israel has sought to decrease dependence on the
United States. 109
The single most important reason that Israel has estab-
lished a defense industry is national existence. Economic
factors although play an important role in the decision
process as to develop an indigenous arms industry.
Steinberg argues that, "Local production allows for import
substitution and, in theory, an improved balance of payment
situation." 110 Further, "In a broader sense, an indigenous
arms industry is seen as providing an industrial
107G.M. Steinberg, "Israel: High-Technology Roulette,"
p. 163.
108G.M. Steinberg, "Israel: High-Technology Roulette,"
p. 163.
109G.M. Steinberg, "Israel: High-Technology Roulette,"
p. 163.
110G.M. Steinberg, "Israel: High-Technology Roulette,"
p. 163.
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infrastructure for Israel. Technology can be developed and
spun off to the civil sector. Isolated and underdeveloped
regions of the country can be developed through location of
military-related industries in these areas and secure
employment provided. n111
Bernard Reich believes that Israel has made important
strides in its arms industry but not without difficulties.
He states, "An indigenous military industry has been an
element of security planning since independence, and
considerable resources have been invested in it with uneven
results. Its basic shortcomings have been resources, both
natural and financial. There is also the problem of
economics of scale and the difficulties posed by the
enormous start-up costs involved in the development and
production of a sophisticated weapons system." 112 Reich
believes that although Israel's military exports have earned
them a substantial amount of foreign exchange, they still
remain dependent upon the United States for many sophisti-
cated weapons systems and some advanced components for their
indigenous production. They also remain dependent on other
nations for critical raw materials. 113
111G.M. Steinberg, "Israel: High-Technology Roulette,"
p. 163.
112 Bernard Reich, "Israel," p. 216, as presented in
Security Policies of Developing Countries , D.C. Heath and
Company, Lexington Massachusetts, 1982.
113 B. Reich, "Israel," p. 216.
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Another important problem facing Israel is their human-
resource situation. As a country with a population of about
four million it is very difficult to compete on the level
they desire. 114
India faces the same technological disadvantages as
fellow Third World nations. Defense planning in any Third
World nation must consider the advantages and disadvantages
of the following two production options. One, a nation can
indigenously produce weapons. The obvious advantage in this
approach is political immunity from outside interference.
The disadvantages lie in comparative qualitative factors and
time lags between research and development and actual
service entry. There is also the problem of not being able
to guarantee that a weapons system will perform to the
minimum acceptable levels.
The second approach is production by license. This
alleviates the chances of a system not performing as
desired. It also eliminates costly research and develop-
ment expenses and unavoidable setbacks of trial and
error. 115 According to Raju G. C. Thomas, one disadvantage
to the license approach is that ". . . it does not provide
Indian scientists and engineers with sufficient training and
114 B. Reich, "Israel," p. 216.
115Raju G.C. Thomas, "Defense Planning in India," p.
256, as presented in Defense Planning in Less-Industrialized
States, Stephanie G. Neuman, editor, D.C. Heath and Company,
Lexington, Massachusetts, 1984.
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experience in weapons design and development since the draw-
ings are directly supplied by the overseas manufacturer." 116
India's defense acquisition policy varies from service
to service and complexity of systems. The dependent varia-
bles are based on whether a system is capital or labor
intensive and technologically simple or advanced. Thomas
argues, "As compared to the labor-intensive and
technologically simpler defense programs of the army, the
defense programs of the air force and the navy tend to be
more capital intensive and call for relatively more sophis-
ticated technology." During the 1950' s, India attempted to
indigenously design and produce a Mach-2 capable fighter-
bomber called the HF-24 Marut. There were numerous design
and production setbacks. The Marut was not delivered until
the late 60' s, and when it was delivered it did not have a
Mach-2 capability and was already obsolete. This fact
coupled with its poor performance during the 1971 Indo-
Pakistani war prompted Indian officials to phase the Marut
out of production. 117
Because of the Marut incident, India adopted a policy of
directly purchasing more advanced weapons with a subsequent
plan to manufacture under license. 118 This is especially
true in regard to advanced aircraft. During the 1980 's,
116R.G.C. Thomas, "Defense Planning in India," p. 256.
117R.G.C. Thomas, "Defense Planning in India," p. 257.
118R.G.C. Thomas, "Defense Planning in India," p. 256.
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India planned to purchase the Anglo-French Jaguar fighter-
bomber. Both aircraft were planned, purchases followed by
subsequent manufacture under license in India. The United
States' decision to sell the F-16 aircraft to Pakistan
prompted the Indian government to scrap the license phase of
its plan in order to receive a greater number of Jaguars in
the short-term. India's license production of the aircraft
was not to provide deployment until the late 1980 's at the
earliest. 119 As seen later in this study the plan to
purchase the Jaguar aircraft never materialized.
As it has been pointed out, there are some similarities
as to why a Third World nation becomes an arms producer.
There are also common problems associated with constrained
resources that affect all Third World nations. It is more
difficult to establish just what the various stages are that
Third World defense industries transit on their way to total
indigenous production. Michael Moodie does a good job
providing seven steps in which a Third World defense
industry can progress. They are: 120
First, maintenance and overhaul facilities are estab-
lished for the service and repair of imported arms.
Second, indigenous assembly of weapons systems or
other equipment under license is negotiated. At this
stage, nothing is fabricated locally but imported
119R.G.C. Thomas, "Defense Planning in India," p. 256.
120Michael Moodie, Sovereignty, Security, and Arms , The
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown
University, Sage Publications, Inc., Beverly Hills,
California, 1979, p. 46.
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knocked-down kits are fitted together in domestic
plants.
Third, as indigenous assembly continues, simple com-
ponents are manufactured locally under license while more
sophisticated technologies such as engines and electronics
continue to be imported. It is important when an industry
reaches this stage, because the country can then begin to
earn foreign exchange by selling components it produces
either back to the licenser or to some other customer.
Fourth, the number of components produced domestically
is increased until a point is reached at which it can be
said the entire system is produced locally under license.
Fifth, the less industrialized arms producer makes
modifications in systems in manufactures under license.
Modifications can be so extensive in some cases that the
licensee will claim it has made the system sufficiently
different that the licensing agreement and its controls no
longer apply.
Sixth, production of domestically designed and tested
systems is undertaken using imported components of more
sophisticated technologies.
Finally, domestically designed systems using no
imported components are produced.
Moodie cautions that these are not discreet stages. In
reality it is difficult to distinguish where one stage ends
and the next one begins. He also points out that a nation
may be in more than one stage at a time. 121
F. THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY
There seems to be a common trend in all arms producing
Third World nations, that is the difficulties of producing
competitively advanced weapons systems due to the ever-
increasing North-South technological gap. Those LDC ' s that
have a proven and successful arms industry have been those
121M. Moodie, Sovereignty, Security, and Arms , p. 46.
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that one, have capitalized on upon existing industries and
applied them to the military sector; and two, have imported
the necessary military technology to close the technological
gap. 122
Arms trade in general supplies a significant source of
technology transfer for the Third World nation. According
to Arlinghaus, "The arms trade with developing nations
provides an important source of technology transfer at two
levels. First, the weapons themselves require the transfer
of operational, technical, logistic, and managerial skills
for their maintenance and employment. Second, through
repair, modification, coproduction facilities developed
within recipient nations, these transfers represent an




In addition to the above-mentioned effects arms transfer
has on a Third World nation's technological development,
there are also the advantages that accompany reverse-
engineering. There is much debate over the impact that
reverse-engineering has had upon the technological
development of Israel. According to Steinberg, "In analyz-
ing the rate of Israeli technological development, some
analysts have also questioned the degree to which this rapid
122 B.E. Arlinghaus, "Social versus Military
Development: Positive and Normative Dimensions," p. 43.
123 B.E. Arlinghaus, "Social versus Military
Development: Positive and Normative Dimensions," p. 43.
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evolution has been assisted by technology purchased from the
USA as well as reverse-engineering and copying of weapons
acquired from the USA and other sources. Raytheon, for
example, claims that the Shafrir's infra-red guidance system
is based on the system it developed for the US
Sidewinder." 124
There is little question that military technology
transfer has its advantages for the Third World, but some
scholars believe that these advantages are not as great as
one might expect and not nearly as beneficial as non-
military technology transfer. Arlinghaus argues this point:
First, most military technology is nonproductive,
contributing relatively little to the overall national
economy of recipient nations. While some of the equipment
of military forces is adaptable to civilian, civic-action,
or nation-building uses, much of it is not. The growth of
military forces and accompanying increases in domestic
military expenditures may stimulate growth through
increased demand, but may also add to the inflation. The
added external foreign debt and annual debt service that
arms purchases represent in scarce hard currencies add to
balance of payments and other financial problems.
Second, military technology is designed to be put to
military uses. Even if only intended for its stabilizing,
deterrent value, such technology may lead to regional arms
races, increased conflicts, and its employment against the
force of the supplier nation.
Third, indigenous defense industries must, to operate
economically, seek export markets to subsidize high
initial costs and to lower the individual end-item cost
for their forces. This means that there will be a
continuing proliferation of arms suppliers in an already
crowded and highly competitive marketplace.
124G.M. Steinberg, "Israel: High-Technology Roulette,"
p. 169.
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Fourth, because of the technology absorption problems
that recipient nations experience, they either become
dependent upon large numbers of "white collar mercenaries"
to maintain and operate weapons systems, or send large
numbers of trainees to supplier nations. These are
expensive, short-term solutions to the problem, cause
domestic political and economic difficulties, and are
subject to phenomena such as the brain drain, the
inappropriateness of training, and neocolonialism.
Finally, military technology has peculiar security
aspects. The transfer of state-of-the-art equipment to
developing nations may speed its compromise (in addition
to the loss of proprietary information) . Coproduction of
or large stocks of spares and ammunition permit recipient
nations to covertly avoid end-use agreements and
retransfer military technology to embargoed nations. This
reduces the usefulness of arms transfer and "spare-parts
diplomacy" as a foreign-policy tool and suppliers may
hesitate to provide the means to create such an
indigenous—and therefore independent—capacity. 125
G . SUMMARY
The reasons a Third World nation imports arms are
varied. It may be in part due to the perceived threat or as
a source of pride. The reasons they become arms producers
may be influenced by the above along with the desire not to
be dependent on outside sources for arms. This is certainly
the case in South Africa and Israel. For the cases of
Brazil and South Korea, profit motivation may be a factor
along with the perceived threat and other variables.
In any event, technology plays an important role for the
Third World arms producers. The common trend in all arms
producing nations is the difficulties of producing
competitively advanced weapons systems due to the
125B.E. Arlinghaus, "Social versus Military
Development: Positive and Normative Dimensions," p. 43.
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ever-increasing North-South technological gap. Those
nations that have developed a successful arms industry have
capitalized firstly, upon existing industries and applied
them to the military sector and secondly, have acquired the
necessary military technology to close the technological
gap. This is where the question of Western technology
assimilated into Soviet weapons, enters. Once again the
linkage between assimilated Western technology and the
American national interest lies with the element of defense.
The United States loses revenue and influence associated
with normal technology transfer with the Third World. This
loss, coupled with Soviet gains in those same areas,
negatively impacts national defense, thus hindering the
pursuit of the national interest.
The next chapter will address the subject of the USSR's
arms trade with the Third World along with the possibility
of Soviet-acquired Western technology being assimilated into
the Third World's defense industries.
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VII. THE SOVIET UNION; ARMS TRADE WITH THE THIRD WORLD
Arms transfer is a multi-billion dollar business and the
Third World is a large contributor to the revenue that an
arms exporter receives. David K. Whynes contributes the
rationale for Third World defense expenditure and the
reasons why it has grown, to certain factors that can be





the influence of the budgetary process
4. the existence of a military-industrial complex
5. the vested interests of the military establishment
6. the needs of ideology and national identity
7. imperialism
The Soviet Union has, in the past, and still remains, a
major arms supplier to the Third World. Of particular
interest to this paper are those Third World nations that
may have imported and license-produced Soviet weapons that
may have incorporated Western technology (Appendix A)
.
The Soviet Union's involvement in the Third World dates
back to its conception as a nation. The peoples of
developing nations have been regarded in the sphere of
126D.K. Whynes, The Economics of Third World Military
Expenditures , p. 16.
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influence of the Soviet Union because the USSR is the center
of the world communist movement, and that ideological move-
ment is guided by historical inevitability to convert the
world, starting with the most pure nations, those that are
not capitalist. Thus the Third World has been traditionally
considered natural allies of socialism by Soviet
theoreticians. 127 As Third World nations began to receive
their independence from Western imperialism, Soviet doctrine
modernized to support the national liberation movements and
"their" quest to be independent of Western imperialistic
social and economic oppression. This new tactic was' adopted
after Stalin's death. The Soviet Union saw the importance
of the Third World because of its resources as well as a way
to stop or reverse Western influence. The major difference
of the post-Stalin period was that the Soviet Union could
now have friendly and mutually beneficial relations with
Third World nations even if they were not socialist.
Much of the Third World was receptive to Moscow's new
policy toward developing nations. 128 A large percentage of
this receptibility was due to the attractiveness of Soviet
military assistance, the comparatively low prices for
127Roger F. Paja, "The Effectiveness of Soviet Arms Aid
Diplomacy in the Third World," p. 384, as presented in The
Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures ,
Westview Press, Inc., Boulder, Colorado, 1981.
128R.F. Pajak, "The Effectiveness of Soviet Arms Aid
Diplomacy in the Third World," p. 384.
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weapons and favorable terms. 129 The going rate for a MiG-23
was $6.7 million at the time when Israel was paying about
$12 million for an F-15 and the MiG-21 was selling for $2
million when the F-4 was selling for $5.7 million. 130 The
financial terms included two percent interest, with repay-
ment periods averaging 10 years, following a grace period of
one to three years. 131
A United States Department of State report estimates
that since 1977 or possibly earlier, Soviet prices appear to
be increasing and as of 1982 they are roughly equal or
sometimes higher for similar Western weaponry. 132
Considering prices and terms equal between the Soviet
Union and the West for comparable weaponry, one clear
advantage the Soviet Union offers a Third World client is
the speed it can fill an arms order. This is mainly due to
the capacity at which the Soviet Union arms industry runs
at. Expedience is an important factor to a Third World
129R.F. Pajak, "The Effectiveness of Soviet Arms Aid
Diplomacy in the Third World," p. 386.
130R.F. Pajak, "The Effectiveness of Soviet Arms Aid
Diplomacy in the Third World," p. 384.
131R.F. Pajak, "The Effectiveness of Soviet Arms Aid
Diplomacy in the Third World," p. 384.
132,,Conventional Arms Transfers in the Third World,
1972-81," United States Department of State, Special Report
No. 102, August 1982, p. 7.
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nation. It allows Moscow a significant advantage over the
rest of the arms producing world. 133
There are two clear advantages associated with every
Soviet arms sale to the Third World. One is the political
influence it is allowed to exercise over the buying nation
and two, the hard currency it receives from the sale. The
CIA estimated that the Soviet Union earned approximately
$1.5 billion dollars in hard currency from arms sales in
1977# 134
It is difficult to say how politically successful the
Soviet Union's arms sales program has been but one scholar
believes, "Of the various types of foreign assistance
employed by the Soviets—military, economic, and techni-
cal—military aid has proven to be the most dramatic and
consequential. Besides directly contributing to the
emergence, growth, and survival of nonaligned regimes, arms
aid has fostered an image of the Soviet Union as a benign
but powerful anticolonialist power. It has served as the
primary Soviet vehicle for acquiring influence in regions
important to Western interests, often providing the Soviets
with political entree into countries where their role had
hitherto been limited or nonexistent. Furthermore, military
aid has often provided the opening wedge for a variety of
133
"Conventional Arms Transfers in the Third World,
1972-81," p. 8.
134
"Conventional Arms Transfers in the Third World,
1972-81," p. 7.
95
diplomatic, trade, cultural, and other contacts which have
been difficult or impossible to achieve otherwise, such as
in the Arab countries in the 1950* s, India and Indonesia in
the 1960's, and Ethiopia more recently." 135
A. SOVIET ARMS TRANSFER AND WESTERN TECHNOLOGY
Whether or not a linkage exists between Soviet arms
transfers to the Third World and Western technology is the
main thrust of this chapter. In order to comprehensively
cover this subject, it is necessary to examine specific
Soviet weapons and client states, along with any Third
World-produced weapons that may have been developed from
Soviet weapons.
Two interesting one-time or current Third World client
states of the Soviet Union are Egypt and India. The
Egyptian arms industry has developed a unique know-how in
regard to reverse-engineering and manufacturing of Soviet
weapons. 136 This approach of reverse-engineering may partly
be due to Soviet reluctance to supply Egypt with the neces-
sary technology to produce weapons by license. The Egyptian
surface-to-surface (SSM) missile program failed when the
135R.F. Pajak, "The Effectiveness of Soviet Arms Aid
Diplomacy in the Third World," p. 393.
13 6R. Vayrynen and T. Ohlson, "Egypt: Arms Production
in the Transnational Context," p. 120, as presented in Arms
Production in the Third World , edited by Michael Brzoska and
Thomas Ohlson, Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute, Taylor and Francis, London and Philadelphia,
1986.
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Soviet Union, in the early 1970' s, refused to supply the
necessary guidance technology assistance. 137
Egypt did not receive the state-of-the-art Soviet
weapons. Gabriel Ben-Dor believes this to be a factor in
the outcomes of past Egyptian conflicts in the Middle East.
Ben-Dor argues, "The 1967 war also demonstrated the poor
integration of the air force and the air-defense system, the
poor serviceability of aircraft, and the other glaring
weaknesses in the human and organizational structure." 138
Further he states, "In the absence of more advanced Soviet
aircraft available -to Egypt, a direct Soviet role in Egypt's
air defense evolved, eventually creating a dense system of
surface-to-air missiles that began to show its effectiveness
in the dying days of the War of Attrition." 139 This indi-
cates the Soviet Union was more willing to get directly
involved in a Third World client states' conflict than
transfer their front line weapons.
Beginning in 1984, Egypt started assembling an unspeci-
fied number of Chinese F-7 fighters at their Helwan factory.
137R. Vayrynen and T. Ohlson, "Egypt: Arms Production
in the Transnational Context," p. 117.
138Gabriel Ben-dor, "Egypt," p. 190, as presented in
SEcurity Policies of Developing Countries , D.C. Heath and
Company, Lexington Massachusetts, 1982.
139G. Ben-Dor, "Egypt," p. 190.
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The significance there lies in the fact that the F-7 is the
Chinese copy of the Soviet MiG-21. 140
The theory that the Soviet Union exports only older
generation, less technologically advanced weapons is true
with the possible exception of India. Most scholars argue
the Soviet Union's arms transfer relationship with India has
indeed been mutually beneficial.
After India's severe failure with the HF-24 Marut
fighter they adopted an arms policy of importing sophisti-
cated weapons followed by an agreement to license and
produce them. The Marut dilemma was partly the reason that
India turned to the Soviet Union for arms assistance. 141 In
1960 India was the first and only non-socialist nation to
negotiate a license to produce a contract with the Soviet
Union. This contract called for the initial delivery of 38
Soviet-made MiG-21 fighters followed by a gradual incorpora-
tion of Indian-made components followed by full indigenous
production of the aircraft. The Indian MiG-21 plant in
which the Soviets supplied technical assistance and
14
°R. Vayrynen and T. Ohlson, "Egypt: Arms Production
in the Transnational Context," p. 115.
141H. Wulf, "India: The Unfulfilled Quest for Self-
Suf ficiency, " p. 135, as presented in Arms Production in the
Third World , edited by Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson,
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Taylor and
Francis, London and Philadelphia, 1986.
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machinery to build, was scheduled to close in 1985 after
more than 500 aircraft were to be produced. 142
When India was searching for a more advanced aircraft in
the 1970 's, they looked into the Soviet MiG-23/27, the
Swedish Viggen, the Anglo-French Jaguar, and the French
Mirage. All things considered, the Indian government chose
the Jaguar for the possible reason to diversify supply
sources. 143 India never actually bought any Jaguars. The
Soviet's not wanting to lose any ground in India offered
them a projected plan that would cost less than the Western
one. They were allowed to pay in rupees instead of foreign
exchange, at only 2.5 percent interest, over 17 years,
followed by an initial seven-year grace period. 144
India has a unique relationship with the Soviet Union.
The Soviet rules regarding Third World arms exports do not
seem to apply to India. Not only is India the only non-
socialist country to license-produce Soviet-designed
weapons, as H. Wulf argues, "While by 1984 the MiG-27 has
not been flown by the Soviet Air Force, it entered service
in India in late 1984. Plans for its manufacture in India
include transfer of technology for making subsequent
142 H. Wulf, "India: The Unfulfilled Quest for Self-
sufficiency," p. 136.
143 H. Wulf, "India: The Unfulfilled Quest for Self-
sufficiency," p. 135.
144 H. Wulf, "India: The Unfulfilled Quest for Self-
sufficiency," p. 136.
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versions, especially the MiG-29 and possibly the MiG-31
which is still in the design stage. It is reported that
India has already placed a firm order for the MiG-29." 145
B. SUMMARY
Arms trade with the Third World is very important to the
Soviet Union (Appendix B) . It yields a source of hard
currency; allows the Soviets to exert "spare parts
diplomacy" upon their client states, and possibly more
importantly it allows them access to strategic regions they
would not previously have.
As mentioned earlier in this paper, there are indica-
tions that Western technology is incorporated in much of
Soviet weaponry, from look-down, shoot-down radars to
missile technology.
It would be safe to conclude that the Soviet Union is
benefiting twice from acquired Western technology. First,
by the initial assimilation of technology and the advantages
of using the systems that incorporate that technology, and
second, by the advantages associated with Third World arms
trade as stated above. On the other hand, as seen in the
case of India, the Third World partner is also benefiting
from the same technology in that it not only uses the
product but it also can utilize the Western technology in
145H. Wulf, "India: The Unfulfilled Quest for Self-
sufficiency," p. 135.
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its own defense industry via license or eventual indigenous
production.
The next chapter will examine the question of a grand
technology strategy along with Eastern technology and its
worth to the West.
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VIII. THE QUESTION OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Charles Wolf delineates the question of technology
transfer into three main sections—the security, political,
and economic aspects thereof. 146 Each of these aspects will
be covered for clarification purposes. They are:
Security—The security aspects of technology transfer are
concerned with technology that will enhance Soviet
military capabilities.
Political—The political aspects of technology transfer
refers to the relaxing of controls that further encourage
technological export for the purpose of hoping to ease
political tensions, and somehow manipulate Soviet behavior
in a favorable manner. What are political gains— is
usually a question that has a very subjective answer in
which everyone is their own expert. 147 It all boils down
to comparing the release of a Soviet dissident to the sale
of a microcomputer, which is more valuable in regard to
the national interest.
Economic—The economic aspects of technology transfer
refer to the potential economic gains for U.S. exports if
controlled markets are opened. Wolf argues that, "The
gains are likely to be modest: modest, though not
negligible. ..." He further contests, in regard to high
technology exports to the USSR, "we should be more con-
cerned with what we can get in return than with whether to
relax controls." 148
Wolf has one solution to the question of technology
transfer. The United States should: one, "identify those
146 C. Wolf, "Soviet Economic Stringencies: External
Reactions and Repercussions," p. 2.
147 C. Wolf, "Soviet Economic Stringencies: External
Reactions and Repercussions," p. 3.
148 C. Wolf, "Soviet Economic Stringencies: External
Reactions and Repercussions," p. 2.
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cases in which we can benefit from Soviet technology; and
two, facilitate technology impact in those cases." 149 He
concludes that technological trade with the Soviets is not
bad. The United States should negotiate to get more current
payment, instead of deferred payment through buy-back
arrangements; greater incentives for the Soviets to dig into
their gold stocks; and higher prices for what is
exported. 150
Wolf made the statement that the United States should be
more concerned with what it gets in return. The possible
trade of U.S. technology for Soviet technology may be one of
these returns. The next few paragraphs will examine that
question.
A. THE DESIRABILITY OF SOVIET TECHNOLOGY
The West should not tip its nose up at Soviet
technology. According to J. Wilczynski, "The USSR is a
recognized leader in the technology of automatic and semi-
automatic welding, the blast furnace smelting of iron ore,
the electrolytic extraction of zinc, magneto-hydrodynamic
and turbo generators, fast-breeder reactors, thermonuclear
fusion, the high-voltage long-distance transmission of
149 C. Wolf, "Soviet Economic Stringencies: External
Reactions and Repercussions," p. 4.
150C. Wolf, "Soviet Economic Stringencies: External
Reactions and Repercussions," p. 6.
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power, stereoscopic color . . . "151 These are some
examples. The list goes on.
American industry has found use for Soviet technology.
Both General Electric and General Motors have purchased
Soviet electronic and computer components. 152 Another exam-
ple supporting the utility value of Soviet technology to the
United States can be seen by Soviet licenses purchases by
American firms. Some of these include:
Soviet Licenses Purchases by US Firms
American Home Products Pharmaceutical drug "pyroxam"
Chemetron Continuous welding electrodes
Reynolds Metals Casting of Aluminum ingots
Texas Utilities Services Underground gasification of
lignite
Universal Oil Products Tube reducers
The socialist market is open from their vantage point.
Wilczynski believes that Western technology is very impor-
tant to them not only because they earn hard currency but
because of the psychological and political rewards they
151j. wilczynski, "The East-West Technology Gap and the
Reverse Flow of Technology," Acta Oecomomica . 15, 1975, p.
297.
15 2j
> wilczynski, "The East-West Technology Gap and the
Reverse Flow of Technology," p. 299.
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believe they reap, i.e., showing the superiority of
socialism. 153
Wilczynski's findings support Wolf's theory in that he
shows there to be desirable Soviet technology and that they
are willing trading partners. Soviet technology might be
one more thing the United States could get in return.
Although, Stefan Possony and J.E. Pournelle have a different
approach to the question.
B. TECHNOLOGY AND STRATEGY
Technology is undoubtedly a key force in the development
of U.S. defense strategy. Weapons technology may be the
most important factor that drives national security affairs.
The ability to defend the interests of the United States is
utmost. Weapons technology is the tool that enables this
defense. It is the driving force today, in that it dictates
strategy and in most instances, foreign policy.
No other component of national security affairs can
alter the strategic balance as does weapons technology. An
example of this was the atomic bomb and later the hydrogen
bomb and the ICBM. It was technology driving technology at
perpetual motion proportions. Technology can account for
justification for disparity of numbers. This is certainly
the case when comparing NATO with the Warsaw Pact.
153J. Wilczynski, "The East-West Technology Gap and the
Reverse Flow of Technology," p. 304.
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Wolf's argument on technology transfer was to trade
smart, that is get the most from the Soviets while not
adversely affecting the United States' national security.
Possony and Pournelle have a different idea.
Possony and Pournelle believe that the United States is
in a technological war with the Soviets, a war it should
fight to win. 154
1. The Technological War
Possony and Pournelle, in their book, The Strategy
of Technology; Winning the Decisive War , stress that
America should realize its strengths and build upon them.
They contest, "America's main chance is to trust ourselves
instead of our enemies, to remain stronger and to be more
effective builders of peace than our foes. Technology is
America's manifest destiny." 155 They further argue, "The
United States is at war. Whether we consider this to be the
Protracted Conflict initiated in 1917 by the Bolsheviks or
something new brought about by the march of technology in
this century, the war is taking place and it cannot be
escaped. The field of engagement is not everywhere bloody.
Except for financial sacrifices, many citizens of the West
and subjects of Communism may be unaware that the conflict
154Stefan T. Possony and J.E. Pournelle, The Strategy
of Technology: Winning the Decisive War , University Press
of Cambridge, Massachusetts, 197 0, p. 1.
155S.T. Possony and J.E. Pournelle, The Strategy of
Technology; Winning the Decisive War , p. xxxii.
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has been going on until the decision moment, if it ever
comes, is upon them. For all that, the Technological War is
most real, and we must understand its nature. Our very-
survival depends upon not losing in the technical
arena." 156 It is imperative to define the kind of warfare
fought in a Technological War. The authors define it this
way: "technological warfare is the direct and purposeful
application of the national technological base and of
specific advances generated by that base to attain strategic
and tactical objectives." 157 The technological base refers
to the sum total of resources needed to produce and
constantly modernize the tools of war and peace, including
scientists, inventors, engineers, laboratories, laboratory
equipment, funds, information flow, incentives, etc., as
well as industry and the economy as a whole.
J. Fred Bucy concurs with the importance of technology
to America's future. He suggests, "The United States and
its Western allies . . . rely on America's technological
superiority as an offset to the Soviets' quantitative
military power." 158 Bucy also agrees that maintaining
America's technological superiority is vital to the national
156S.T. Possony and J.E. Pournelle, The Strategy of
Technology: Winning the Decisive War , p. 1.
157S.T. Possony and J.E. Pournelle, The Strategy of
Technology: Winning the Decisive War , p. 4.
158J.F. Bucy, "Technology Transfer and East-West Trade:
A Reappraisal," p. 202.
107
security, but he stresses a problem with security, "this
goal of security has been jeopardized by both the increased
proliferation of technology in general and the lag between
the development of a technology and its application to
weapons systems." 159
Opponents to Possony and Pournelle might say that to
really attempt to win the Technological War might either
trigger an arms race or offset the balance of power to the
extent as to make the world order unstable. The authors
would counter by saying that an arms race is an alternative
to destructive war, not the cause of military conflict and
that the United States had clear strategic superiority in
the late sixties and early seventies that did not provoke
war.
There is an end to the Technological War. "Victory in
the Technological War is achieved when a participant has a
technological lead so far advanced that his opponent cannot
overcome it until after the leader has converted his tech-
nology into decisive weapons systems. The loser may know
that he has lost, and know it for guite a long time, yet be
unable to do anything about it." 160
The authors recognize the political difficulties of
defense versus social spending issues. But they insist,
159J. F. Bucy, "Technology Transfer and East-West Trade:
A Reappraisal," p. 202.
160S.T. Possony and J.E. Pournelle, The Strategy of
Technology: Winning the Decisive War
, p. 12
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"Security has always been and will remain the primary task
of statecraft . . . however . . . supporting other issues,
such as ecology, urban renewal, etc., makes one more
popular." 161 They stress that the main problem with the
Technological War is not technology, which can operate in
all areas, but the fact that politicians are voted for
because they possess personality even though they greatly
lack insight to solve the problems of the times. 162
It is quite obvious that the United States has a clear
advantage in technological capabilities, but it had a clear
strategic superiority at one time also. The United States
has many problems to contend with in fighting the Technolog-
ical War, such as the ad hoc nature of America,
budgetary/domestic constraints, etc., and no Technological
War strategy. The latter-mentioned problem is absolutely a
necessity in order to obtain final victory. It is believed
the Soviets have a technology strategy, and obtaining
American technology is part of it. Due to the open nature
of American society, it would virtually be impossible to
prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining technology
illegally, and through clandestine means, although it could
be made more difficult. Possony and Pournelle did not
address the issue of technology transfer, but one probably
161S.T. Possony and J.E. Pournelle, The Strategy of
Technology: Winning the Decisive War , p. xxiii.
162 S.T. Possony and J.E. Pournelle, The Strategy of
Technology; Winning the Decisive War , p. 12.
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would be safe to say that they would protest trading with
any enemy in any war.
C. SUMMARY
The Soviet Union is a recognized leader in many areas of
technology. These tend to apply more towards the civilian
sector of the United States than the military. For this
reason the U.S. probably would encounter a net loss in
security by exchanging technology with the Soviet Union.
The United States as the world technological leader could
only stand to lose ground to the Soviet Union by any
technological trade arrangement. This does not mean that
the United States should eliminate the notion of transfer-
ring technology to the USSR. As part of a technological
grand strategy, along the lines of that proposed by Possony
and Pournelle, in the future it may be appropriate to allow
certain Western technology to be exchanged in return for
equally-weighted Eastern technology.
Possony and Pournelle emphasize the importance of
technology to America's future. They strongly advocate a
development of a technological strategy that will ensure the
defense of this nation. For them the United States is in a
technological war with the Soviet Union. They may agree
that space is a battlefield and Star Wars is a battle in
motion. The technologically superior nation does not always
win the battle. The Soviet Union could win the Star Wars
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This study set out to define an operational definition
of the national interest that can be used by policy-makers
when formulating technology transfer policy and to examine
five hypotheses that relate to technology. The national
interest was defined in the following way: in brief it is
an instrument of political action in that it is a means of
justifying, denouncing, or proposing policies. It is the
protection of our perceived needs and desires, i.e., the
national identity and core values that make up the essence
of what America is. These include the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the 10th
Federalist Papers.
While researching the national interest, two revelations
began to take hold. First, in order to protect the national
interest, America's number one goal must be to maintain a
strong national defense. It is only from a strong strategic
position that the United States can hope to negotiate other
interests such as world peace, human rights and the spread-
ing of world democracy and freedom. Second, America's
security is paramount to the pursuit of the American Dream.
Therefore the national interest should take priority over
the public interest or economic interests. Foreign and
domestic policy should be formulated with defense in mind.
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A strong defense is key to obtaining both national and
public interest goals.
The first hypothesis is accepted, how one views the
Soviet Union directly affects one's perceptions towards the
imperativeness of the linkage between technology and U.S.
security. Whether one adheres to the mirror-image or power-
maximizing approach toward the Soviet Union directly affects
one's views on the importance of technology to U.S.
security. The results of this hypothesis will be addressed
later in this conclusion.
The second hypothesis is also accepted. Technology is a
vital element of U.S. national security. Technology is
linked to security because of its strategic significance.
As long as U.S. strategic doctrine is based upon the
possessed technological advantage its weapons have over the
Soviets, and as long as strategic doctrine dictates "a come
as you are war," the importance of technology to U.S.
security can not be overemphasized.
The third hypothesis is accepted also. The Soviet Union
greatly benefits from the Western technology it receives,
either overtly or through illegal means. The Soviet Union
has been very successful in acquiring Western technology by
a combination of legal and illegal means. Legally the
Soviets acquire Western technology through open literature,
legal trade channels, and student, scientific, and technical
exchange programs. On the illegal side, there is a major
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and increasing problem of the most advanced Western
technology being acquired by clandestine means.
The fourth hypothesis, Western technology positively
impacts Soviet economic growth, is rejected. There is
little evidence that Western technology significantly
affects Soviet economic growth. Soviet investment in
Western technology is rather small, and total impact on the
Soviet economy is modest.
The fifth hypothesis was an attempt to link the benefits
of Soviet acquired Western technology to the Third World.
It stated that the Soviet Union benefits twice from acquired
Western technology— first from the initial incorporation,
and second from the advantages associated with transferring
those goods to a Third World client. Logical deduction says
this hypothesis is valid, although there is little empirical
data to support it.
One may champion the notion that the USSR only exports
its less sophisticated weapons to the Third World, therefore
the chances of these weapons, even if they have had Western
technology assimilated into them, have little significance
on Western security.
It is generally true that the Soviet Union transfers its
less than state-of-the-art equipment to the Third World.
But one must consider the fact that the Soviet Union's
earlier generation aircraft (such as the MiG-21 and MiG-23)
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fire the AA-2 Atoll air-to-air missile, a missile that was
derived from Western technology. This weapon is in the
arsenal of several Third World nations. Every nation that
uses the Atoll missile is benefiting from Western
technology.
One would logically have to assume that much more
Western technology was assimilated into the Soviet weapons
that are exported to the Third World. Therefore the Soviet
Union is benefiting monetarily through the hard currency it
receives for the weapons as well as politically. This same
currency may in turn be used to finance the acquisition of
more Western technology as well as other defense-related
projects. One can also deduce that the Third World client
state benefits from Western technology in addition to the
inherent value of the product it - buys.
The research associated with this hypothesis led to the
question being asked—does the Third World nation, by its
own indigenous production, benefit from Western technology
that is assimilated into Soviet designs it copies? There
were no facts found that substantiate a yes reply to that
question, although the case of India may apply.
India is an exception to the rule in so much as the
Soviet Union's policy towards Third World arms transfers is
concerned. India is the only non-socialist nation that the
USSR allows to license-produce Soviet weapons.
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Generally, the Soviets do not export their most modern
weapons. This may not be true as far as India is concerned.
The Soviet Union has plans to export its latest generation
aircraft to India. This indicates one, that the Soviets are
willing to export advanced aircraft to India , and two, they
are willing to export these aircraft while simultaneously
fitting their own forces. This is unprecedented in regard
to Soviet arms transfer policy and the Third World. It is
equally significant because this generation of aircraft
contains assimilations of the F-15 look-down, shoot-down
radar and possibly a like F-14 Phoenix air-to-air missile.
These systems represent the latest in Soviet technology as
well as the latest in U.S . -employed technology at this
writing. This of course assumes that the Soviet Union will
give India the full avionics (air intercept radar) package
and not a modified export version which it has historically
done in the past. 163 If this proposed arms deal material-
izes for India, they will benefit from the latest Western
technology and best financial terms the Socialist world can
offer. Only time will tell what the political concessions
the Soviet Union will receive in return.
163 0ther nations are slated to receive the MiG-29. For
example, Iraq reached an agreement with the Soviet Union to
buy the MiG-29 on August 1984. The quantity, cost and
expected delivery dates are unknown. The difference between
Iraqi and Indian agreements with the USSR is that India
license-produces Soviet weapons and Iraq does not.
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One formidable conclusion arrived at from the explora-
tion of the above hypotheses is that technology is extremely
important to the security of both the United States and the
Soviet Union. The question of technology and technology
transfer should be of grave concern to both nations. On the
political side of technology transfer, mirror-imagizers will
argue that trade with the Soviet Union contributes to a more
peaceful world order. The power-maximizers would disagree.
They contend that detente was a futile effort as can be seen
by the Afghanistan invasion. They believe Soviet acquisi-
tion of Western technology is the result of a well thought
out strategy.
Both of these approaches have their faults. The mirror-
imaging approach can be likened to an ostrich with its head
in the sand, and the power-maximizing approach tends to be
over-aggressive in nature. The more prudent approach to the
issue would be not to adopt either approach because both are
defense oriented, but to take an offensive approach to the
issue of technology transfer. The main stumbling block con-
fronting an offensive approach to the issue of technology
transfer is that there is no U.S. technology strategy.
There are no real defined goals and objectives. The
nation's greatest potential strategic advantage over the
Soviets is left to the whim of fate. So, the first step
towards answering the technology transfer question is to
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recognize this deficiency and develop a long term technology
strategy that addresses the issue. This will not be easy.
U.S. decision-makers tend to seek the lost idealism of
the American pragmatic period, and this is not all bad, but
the quest is reflected in certain delusions concerning tech-
nology transfer. They tend to want to favor the political
or economic side of technology transfer instead of promoting
long term security. Whether a policy-maker hears
Gustafson's severe warnings or Miller's mild cautions, he
has a moral obligation to make the prudent choice and adjust
policy accordingly. If in doubt it is better to error on
the conservative side. The Soviets are not going to break
off diplomatic relations with the United States because of a
policy of no technology trade if that is what U.S. tech-
nology strategy dictates.
The second step is to tighten up on Soviet covert
operations as much as possible. Make things hard for them.
This is equally as difficult considering the open society
America is, but it also can be an objective of America's
technology strategy.
Specifics of what the technology strategy should consist
of is a study in itself, but it may include bargaining for
useful Soviet technology. What it must not allow is trading
away technology for a mere handful of tokens as was done
many times in the past.
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The key to developing a technology transfer policy that
is in keeping with the national interest lies in developing
a technology strategy. The strategist must look between the
metaphysical and the empirical, the strategy lies there. It
must be long term and futuristic. Once the strategy is
created, the policy-maker can implement it in an idealistic
manner because it does not have to yield immediate results.
The policy-maker can then positively quest for the tradi-
tional American pragmatic philosophy and with any luck
America could win the technological war before the Soviets
have a chance to counter. At the very least, American




DELIVERIES OF MAJOR ARMS EXPORTERS, 1981-1984
Ratio lo
deliveries






Total, all exporters 100.0 2.6 2.9
Soviet Union 28.4 31.7 "> ] 2.9
United States 24.6 174 1.7 1.2
France 10.7 12.9 4.1 5.7
United kingdom 5.2 5.3 3 1 3.3
West Germans 4.3 4.6 4.2 4.2
italv 2.9 3.4 4 2 4.6
Other Warsaw Pact 7.0 5.5 3.1 5.5
Other N Ml) 2.5 26 2.5 3 ^
Other communist 5.6 6.4 5.9 5.9
Other non-communist 8.9 9. 7 6.9 8.3
Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers
1985, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
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APPENDIX B
VALUE OF ARMS TRANSFERS AND TOTAL
IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, 1973-1983










1973 220 431 5300 10395 20980 41151 21332 41842 1.0 24.8
1974 210 378 4100 7395 24S61 448*. 1 27374 49374 0.8 15.0
1973 300 496 4000 6616 37070 61313 33407 55254 0.8 12.0
1976 500 782 5300 8293 38212 59797 37269 58321 1.3 14.2
1977 750 1108 6600 9755 40926 60490 45227 66847 1.8 14.6
1978 1100 1513 7700 10596 50798 69908 52435 72161 2.2 14.7
1979 1000 1268 12500 15860 57958 73537 64913 82362 1.7 19.3
1980 910 1059 11600 13509 68473 79743 76437 89018 1.3 15.2
1981 685 729 11200 11931 73158 77936 79377 84562 0.9 14.1
1982 685 685 11300 11300 77847 77347 87168 87168 0.9 13.0
1983 1150 1103 9800 9402 80440 77174 91648 87927 1.4 10.
7
Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers
1985, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
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